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From Unipolar To Multipolar

The Remaking Of Global Hegemony

Editor

Ian Boxill

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EDITORIAL

Ian Boxill

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This special issue of IDEAZ focuses on the remaking of global hegemony. Since the rise of China as a global economic force and more recently the reassertion of Russia as a global power, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, a number of observers of international relations have argued that global hegemony has been shifting. The shift has been from a unipolar world dominated by the US toward a multipolar one, with the US, Russia and China as the dominant centres.

In the developing world China's presence as an economic power has become more apparent, particularly following the global financial crisis of 2007 which sent the American and European economies into recession. China's financial investments in Africa have grown exponentially within the past decade. In particular, China has stepped up its presence in Africa largely through its involvement in agriculture and infrastructural development. For example, in Ethiopia China will assist in building a 5,000 km railroad. Western countries have missed out on this investment because of age-old colonial prejudices associated with an Africa of the past.

Most of the papers in this volume, therefore, understandably focus on the US and China since there is a gradually developing perception that the hegemony of the US is being challenged by a growing hegemonic position of China. Andy Knight captures this sentiment in the first article when he argues that while the US remains the main global hegemonic power, this influence may be on the decline. In his concluding section he maintains that while it may be facing "recent challenges to its hegemonic position, posed by the rising states of China, India, Brazil, and a resurgent Russia, the US continues to maintain a hegemonic position in the globe." Nonetheless, as Henry Kissinger warned after the first Gulf War, American's pre-eminence cannot last: "While the US is still

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pre-eminent with respect to military might, it does not have the economic resources to truly dominate the globe”. Knight further argues that this was evidenced by the fact that at the end of the first Gulf war, “it was revealed that the war was financed to the tune of \$37 billion by Arab states and \$17 billion by Germany and Japan.”

This state of flux, where the US remains dominant but not unchallenged, is captured in Raymond Brown’s essay which, drawing as it does on his experience as both diplomat and scholar of international affairs, advances the view that the US remains the preeminent global power, but that this dominance is, nevertheless, being challenged largely by China, which has extended its influence in many parts of the world, especially Africa.

This Chinese influence across the globe is highlighted in Cecelia Green’s paper which focuses on the small states of the Caribbean region. Green examines how immigrant Chinese workers enter the Eastern Caribbean social and economic space as part of the global Chinese workforce.

Unlike the previous writers, Courtney Hogarth does not view expansion of the Chinese sphere of influence as necessarily part of a hegemonic agenda. In fact, Hogarth challenges us to think about hegemony differently, focusing more on the inner-self rather than the nation state.

But what of Europe and Latin America in this discourse on shifting hegemonic centres? Johannes Maerk examines European hegemonic tendencies in the Middle East through the Barcelona Process of 1995, and the counter-hegemonic activities of educational institutions such as the IDEAZ Institute.

Adolfo Laborde, on the other hand, examines possible options for Mexico globally by focusing on the notion of the “Mexican Moment”.

The final article in this collection, by Ufot Inamete, examines hegemony from the perspective of the operation of regional courts that exercise jurisdiction over a number of nation states.

Except for the article by Inamete, all of the contributors to this special volume of *IDEAZ* were presented at the *IDEAZ* Journal/IDEAZ Institute Global Forum, which was held February 27, 2014 at The University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. This forum was hosted by the *IDEAZ* Journal (UWI) and IDEAZ Institute (www.ideaz-institute.com), and focused on global development issues.

The main objective of this annual initiative is to interrogate

specific social, political and economic changes of a global nature in order to determine how they shape development trends and impact on the most vulnerable globally. We at *IDEAZ* journal hope that this special collection will add to our readers' understanding of the social, political and economic dimensions of global change and development.

FROM Hegemony to Post Hegemony?

W. ANDY KNIGHT

Abstract • This paper is divided into four parts. First, the concept of hegemony is explained and a distinction is drawn between hegemony and dominance. Second, a brief history of US hegemony/dominance is provided. Third, some of the challenges to US hegemony are raised, which have been generally used by observers to indicate a waning of American power. And, finally, a brief conclusion is drawn which raises a number of questions for the reader pertaining to the possibility of moving towards a post-hegemonic world.

Keywords post-hegemonic world • American power • dominance

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1970s several scholars and observers of international relations have posited the thesis that the United States of America has either lost its hegemonic position in the globe or is experiencing a decline in its dominance. The late Susan Strange used to chide US academics, in particular, for perpetuating this “myth of America’s lost hegemony”. She was particularly critical of those US academics who not only “unquestionably accepted” the proposition of American hegemonic decline but also took it upon themselves to spread that myth in such a way that it gained credence outside the US¹

While I argue in this paper that, despite challenges to its hegemonic status, the US continues to be a global hegemon, I am cognizant of the need to understand hegemony in the context of the *longue durée* of history. Contrary to what Francis Fukuyama would have us believe, history did not come to an end with the advent of the universalization of Western liberal democracy once the Cold War had thawed.² In fact, during the immediate post-Cold War era, although many states embraced the Western style of liberal democracy and capitalism, we did not witness a true universalization of Western liberal democracy as a ‘final’ form of

government. China and Russia may have embraced capitalism and global markets, but neither of them is 'liberal' or fully 'capitalist'. It is important therefore to question any thesis that posits the continual superiority and progressiveness of the West and the perpetual subordination and backwardness of the Rest.³ Similarly, it is necessary and imperative to take seriously the critiques of those who question the notion that US hegemony is here to stay.⁴ At the same time, this chapter heeds Susan Strange's caution not to accept blindly the view that the US has lost its hegemonic status or that US hegemony is waning.

CONCEPTUALIZING HEGEMONY

Before we can determine whether or not US hegemony is waning, or has been lost, it is important to understand what is meant by hegemony. The simplistic view of hegemony postulates that hegemons are preeminent powers with material and coercive ability to control the weak. Donald Puchala notes that much of the literature on world order treats hegemony as "the institutionalization of privilege, consequent inequality in the distribution of various values, and the injustices inherent in inequality". In other words, hegemony is generally seen as "a condition in human relations to be resented, rejected, and removed".⁵ Wallerstein's take on hegemony is slightly different from Puchala's but attaches similar malevolent qualities to the term. Wallerstein defines hegemony as "that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between so-called 'great powers' is so unbalanced that one power is truly *primus inter pares*; that is, one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural areas".

This malevolent interpretation of hegemony should, therefore, rightly evoke "antihegemonic" action, or what Robert Cox refers to as "counter-hegemony". But Puchala's conception of hegemony is a bit more nuanced than those that equate it with state "dominance" and "preponderance of power". When applied to international relations, a hegemon, according to Puchala, "arises when a single state attains preponderant power and elects to use its power to manage the international system."⁶ For Puchala, the power of the hegemon can be used in both malevolent and benevolent ways. Such a position is in conformity with hegemonic stability theory in that it suggests that the hegemon is a paramount leader or dominant power that has the ability to shape the norms, rules and

institutions of the international system and is expected to enforce the rules it has established by rewarding compliant states while punishing the recalcitrant.⁷

Ian Clark notes that in the international relations literature the term hegemon is central and associated with “a concentration of power”. But he also acknowledges that hegemony is much richer than the concept of primacy. Whereas primacy focuses on “the accretion of material power”, the concept of hegemony “most readily achieves its distinctive identity when it is associated with legitimacy”, respect for the leader and voluntary or non-coercive acquiescence on the part of those being led.⁸ Robert Cox, building on Gramsci, drills even deeper in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the concept of “hegemony”. For him, the term refers to “a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities”.⁹ In a world order in which a hegemon is present, the values and understandings would be relatively stable and ostensibly unquestioned. In other words, the order created by the hegemon would be considered by most actors in the system as “the natural order”. The structure of values and understandings is always underpinned by a structure of material power in a system where the hegemon is present. That material power is what infuses the hegemon with characteristics of dominance and preponderance. But, as Cox points out, dominance is not sufficient for hegemony to be exhibited. “Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of doing and thinking have acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states.” To put it another way, it is those social practices and the ideologies that explain and legitimize them that, in fact, lay the foundation of a hegemonic order.¹⁰

David Forsythe further expands on Cox’s take on hegemon by making the point that great powers do not rely on “dominance, coercion and hard power alone”. Also drawing on Gramsci, Forsythe maintains that “Great powers get their way most effectively by securing voluntary or even unthinking cooperation from others.” Thus, a hegemon does not have to rely on costly coercion to get what it wants.¹¹ It can, as Joseph Nye suggests, utilize soft power to induce cooperation.¹² The intellectual and moral leadership, framed by the ideational terms of reference, is what separates hegemony from dominance.

BRIEF HISTORY OF US HEGEMONY/DOMINANCE

According to Immanuel Wallerstein, hegemonic power was exercised three times in the modern world system. The first time was by the United Provinces in the mid-17th century. The second was by Britain in the 19th century. And, the third was by the United States in the 20th century until the present.

When the US assumed the mantle of global leadership from Great Britain, it initially acted as a dominant power rather than a hegemon. During the interwar period, the US seemed to have a clear idea of the type of international order that it wanted to create. Under President Franklin Roosevelt that order was conceived as having a set of multilateral organizations, starting with a body – the United Nations – that would replace the defunct League of Nations, and an apex organ called the Security Council (which would include five permanent members with veto power who would be responsible for guaranteeing the peace). This vision also called for a number of new economic institutions – the Bretton Woods system, which emerged from a conference in 1944. That system would include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank), and the International Trade Organisation (ITO). These organizations were expected to promote and administer an open, liberal and multilateral world economy. The US Congress nixed the idea of an International Trade Organization, but in its place was established a negotiating forum, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Immediately after World War II, the international order, as envisaged by the US, was established based on the Atlantic Charter to maintain the peace which had eluded the League of Nations. Thus was ushered in the era of Pax Americana which replaced Pax Britannica.

There is no question that after World War II the US emerged largely unscathed as arguably the most powerful nation state the world had known.¹³ Fareed Zakaria notes that by 1945, the US' GDP was at least ten times that of Great Britain. The US also took over several British military bases in places like Canada, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.¹⁴ Its industrial production outstripped all other nations and it was able to devise a plan (the Marshall Plan) to rebuild the shattered economies of Germany and Japan. Furthermore, the US emerged from WWII as “the world’s foremost military power in conventional terms, but it also held a strategic monopoly on atomic weapons” and used those weapons to devastate Hiroshima and

Nagasaki.¹⁵ This was clearly a sign that the US was a dominant power, but it was not necessarily hegemonic. However, as Chandra Muzaffar reminds us, the US was also at the forefront of science and technology in the immediate post-World War II period. This gave the US a major advantage over other states with respect to the dissemination of information and the popularization of American culture.

It is in the pervasiveness of American culture that we see signs of US hegemony. Aided by the phenomenon of globalization, people around the world have gravitated voluntarily to American Pop music, Hollywood films and TV programmes, magazines, urban fashion, art and architecture, and fast foods. Some have referred to America's pervasive cultural influence fittingly as "the McDonaldization of culture".¹⁶ But US hegemony has extended well beyond its cultural influences. US hegemony is also embodied in the countless regimes (principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes) that operate in various corners of the globe.

CHALLENGES TO US HEGEMONY

Muzaffar has argued, quite convincingly, that US hegemony was never really global or total.¹⁷ Despite the fact that America exhibited a concentration of overwhelming military power, political power, economic power, scientific and technological power and information and cultural power in the post-World War II period, there have been at least five major challenges to US hegemonic ambitions.

First, the Soviet Union posed a challenge to US hegemony almost immediately after WWII. Although both the US and the USSR were allies during the war, the ideological differences between capitalist US and communist USSR were too massive to overcome in the immediate postwar period. This period, known as the Cold War, dating from 1945 to roughly 1991, was characterized by bipolarity and a precarious balance of power. US President Harry Truman devised the Truman Doctrine in 1947 as a means of checking communist advances. Germany was divided into the German Federal Republic (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the US established a military alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – to protect Western Europe from a possible Soviet security threat. Meanwhile, the Soviets countered with the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 in order to protect its European satellites from a possible US threat. What resulted was a bitter ideological confrontation between the

two superpowers which was played out by proxies in different parts of the globe and within the UN Security Council as well. This Cold War climate, it is argued, placed a check on US hegemony.

Second, in 1949 the US-backed Kuomintang regime in Beijing was overthrown by Mao Tse-Tung in a popular revolution. Under Mao China decided to embrace the communist ideology and to split with the US. China therefore posed a challenge to US hegemony by rejecting liberal capitalism. North Korea also posed a challenge to US hegemony when it separated from South Korea as a result of the Korean War (1950-53), and embraced communism. Vietnam, which suffered huge casualties during its war with the US, also rejected liberal capitalism. Cuba, in the American backyard, chose to align itself ideologically with the Soviets rather than the Americans. These developments can be said to have countered US' global hegemony with respect to its spread of liberal capitalist ideology.

The third development which stymied the Americans in their quest for global and total hegemony occurred during the 1950s and 1960s when the significant growth in nationalism led to a large number of states from Africa and Asia opting for independence from their colonial masters. Some of these states decided to align themselves with the US, but a large number of them preferred to stake out an independent path that would put them neither in the Soviet nor the American ambit. Those non-aligned states attempted to use the UN General Assembly as a forum to resist Westernization and particularly Americanization. They adopted resolutions that would establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and a New International Information Order (NIIO) as a counter to the US liberal capitalism and the Western dominated global media. But by the early 1980s, both movements lost steam, and resistance to US hegemony was weakened.¹⁸

The fourth challenge to American hegemony comes from its own imperial overstretch. Paul Kennedy, in his book on *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, predicted that the US would go the way of previous great powers by overextending itself abroad.¹⁹ Today, the US has a network of about 737 military bases and other installations in more than 130 countries. Since the early 1990s, the US has been involved in a number of wars which have drained its resources. Examples include the 1990 war with Iraq with the declared objective of liberating Kuwait from the tentacles of Saddam Hussein; the failed invasion of Somalia; the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq after the 9-11 terrorist attacks on US soil;

the failed and on-going military expedition in Afghanistan; and the so-called global war on terror. In each case, the financial and personnel costs have “sapped the strength of the US economy” and challenged US hegemony.²⁰ Earl Fry bluntly states that “US global military commitments are unsustainable over a long period of time when placed within the context of debilitating US domestic problems and growing competition from abroad.”²¹

Finally, the fifth challenge to US hegemony is the rise of competing nations and blocs. The advent of the European Union (EU) and the economic integration of countries in Europe posed a slight challenge to US hegemony. For instance, the adoption of the Euro by almost all the members of the EU has provided competition for the US dollar. The US trade deficit with Europe has further contributed to weakening the US dollar. The rise of China as an economic power and the fact that Chinese manufacturing companies are out-producing US companies is another reason for concern. China is expected to surpass the US as the world’s largest manufacturer by 2020²² and it is predicted to become the world’s largest economy in dollar-based GDP by 2041, according to Goldman Sachs. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are also expected to out-produce the US, the UK, France, Germany, Japan and Italy combined by 2039.²³ In Latin America, a number of states have joined together to resist the hegemonic pressure from the US. The Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas (ALBA), the brainchild of the Venezuelan President Chávez, was established in 2004 to counter the hegemonic idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would have perpetuated US hegemony over Latin America.

Clearly, there have been challenges to the US hegemonic position during the Cold War era and beyond. But have these challenges resulted in the demise of the hegemon?

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD?

It is certainly likely as Earl Fry predicted that by 2040 the US will no longer be a global hegemon and the so-called “unipolar moment” will draw to a close. Indeed, we may be moving towards a post-hegemonic world in which there will be no single overarching dominant power.²⁴ The era of Pax Americana that was ushered in after World War II placed the US in the unenviable position of being the world’s policeman and shouldering the

brunt of the economic costs of establishing norms and regional and multilateral institutions to sustain its global hegemonic position.²⁵ Being a global hegemon has meant that the US was pivotal to the construction of the post WWII world order. It did so at a time when British hegemony was waning and when an alternative, potentially hegemonic, actor – the USSR – was emerging to challenge the US hegemonic position. Despite the superpower rivalry and bipolar environment of the Cold War period, the US nevertheless was able to maintain a position of dominance, if not hegemony, within the international system.

When the Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that the US was indeed the foremost superpower in history – the most powerful nation state to have ever existed²⁶ – and America experienced what some observers call a “unipolar moment”. During the immediate post-Cold War era, many historians and political scientists were forced to acknowledge that Henry Luce was right when he forecasted in *Life* magazine, published 17 February 1941, that the 20th century would be known as the “American Century”. Despite the recent challenges to its hegemonic position, posed by the rising states of China, India, Brazil, and a resurgent Russia, the US continues to maintain a hegemonic position in the globe. But, to repeat Henry Kissinger’s warning after the first Gulf War, American preeminence cannot last. While the US is still preeminent with respect to military might, it does not have the economic resources to truly dominate the globe any longer.²⁷ Evidence of this fact reared its head after the first Gulf War when it was revealed that the war was financed to the tune of \$37 billion by Arab states and \$17 billion by Germany and Japan. As the *Economist* put it back then, the US “knows that it no longer has the economic clout to run a hegemony”.²⁸

A major question for observers of international politics then is whether or not the US, as a global hegemon, has created a post-hegemonic world “that can no longer be dominated by any single state or its cultural fruits?”²⁹ Another important question is: are we moving towards a multipolar system with key actors that include the US, China, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and the EU? But the most critical question is: will the US be content to be simply *primus inter pares* in that leading group of countries? One thing is certain, while it would be a mistake to prophesy the imminent decline of US hegemony, it would be “just as erroneous to engage in American triumphalism”.³⁰

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Notes

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FROM Unipolarity to Bipolarity

The global system in transition

RAYMOND L. BROWN

Abstract • The dynamics of international system is constantly in flux. Evolution of international institutions, actors, patterns, rules and norms proceeds slowly; but strategic changes comprehensively affect the entire system. The United States of America (US) is the only actor at this stage of the 21st century that has the capacity to project hard and soft power on a global scale. The US military – with its standing army, marine assault units, special operations, mobile armour, long-range and tactical aircraft, and powerful blue-water navy – is superior to all other militaries today. Indeed, US defense spending approximates half of total global military spending – greater than China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, India, Brazil and South Africa, combined. Consequently, in the contemporary global configuration, there is no viable challenger or near term rival that threatens the current dynamics of global power.

Keywords global system • bipolarity • unipolarity

INTRODUCTION

Strictly speaking, today's international system does not display a clear unipolar superpower configuration. In fact, contemporary trends have already begun the transition from a unipolar system with the United States as global hegemon, to a bipolar system with China moving to occupy the other pole. Emerging markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America are forming regional anchor states and institutions that leverage joint engagement with the international system. The expanding influence of the United Nations family or organizations and the various regional and sub-regional institutional arrangements that are coming into existence can magnify the influence of local interests as globalization intensifies. Diverse non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and philanthropic foundations have become new sources of funding and ideas for

various types of national and multilateral action. In economic terms, for example, the transition toward a bipolar system is readily apparent as China's role as a center of global manufacturing and trade makes the ASEAN market a strategic pole of the pan-Pacific economic community.

Yan Xuetong of the Tsinghua Center for Global Policy believes the US' status as the strongest superpower has been eroding since the end of the Cold War. He argues that the "international superpower dynamic" is in transition from a US primary unipolar system to a bipolar system with China holding the other pole. He observed on this point:

The superpower disparity between China and the United States is narrowing. China's GDP in 2011 is expected to be 45 per cent of the US GDP. If China's GDP continues to grow at 8.5 per cent per year and the US GDP grows at less than 3.8 per cent, the current GDP disparity between the two powers will level out within the decade. Meanwhile, in the next ten years, the economic disparity between both powers and the rest of the world will continue to widen. In the next five years, only the United States and China will be able to spend more than \$100 billion (USD) on defense, increasing the gap (Xuetong 2011).

The key question pertains: How long will the US quasi "unipolar moment" last? Only time will tell.

Clearly, US post-Cold War primacy as the sole remaining superpower has stabilized into a much more complex global system where the US is merely without peer. However, reports of the demise of the United States have been greatly exaggerated.

These trends foreshadow the future possibility of a world organized around multiple power centers which include major and minor "power players". Since the fall of the Berlin Wall nearly a quarter of a century ago, the emergence of new centers of power and influence, especially the rise of the European Union, China and India as major regional actors, will test the international system in coming decades.

A transitional period of unbalanced bipolarity seems to me to be the likely next phase, with China as the principal counterpoise to the USA. But it is important to emphasize that the European Union, India, Russia, Japan, Brazil and South Africa represent influential power centers and it is likely that additional multinational partnerships of this type will continue to project their power and interests within the evolving international system.

International relations analysts differ regarding the relative

stability of unipolar versus multipolar systems. Classical realist theorists (e.g., Hans Morgenthau, Richard Niebuhr and E. H. Carr, etc.) believe that multi-polar systems are more stable than bi-polar models. The neo-realists (e.g., Robert J. Art, Joseph Grieco, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz, etc.), in comparison, focus on security, and assert that in a multi-polar system, states often misjudge the intentions of other states, which unnecessarily compromises their own security and leads to conflict. States in a bi-polar system are believed by neo-realists to always focus their fears on only one other power and are therefore more stable.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMS OF ART

The international relations concept of polarity describes how state power is configured and distributed in the international system. Generally speaking, there are four types or models of polarity – uni-polarity, bi-polarity, tri-polarity, and multi-polarity – to describe four or more centres of power. The type of system at any given time is determined by how power is distributed and employed to influence the behaviour of states.

- Many analysts describe the post-Cold War international system as uni-polar, with the USA in the predominant position.
- Multi-polarity describes a power distribution where three or more nation states share similar amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence.
- A new concept of non-polarity describes a situation in which many centers of power exist, but no center dominates any other center. The novel aspect of this concept is that nation states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups, and such can also be centres of local, regional or global power.

THE COLD WAR AND BI-POLARITY

The historical interregnum in Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Dark Ages, the Medieval Period, and the Treaty of Westphalia conceptually included both multi-polar and non-polar characteristics. In 1647, following the Treaty of Westphalia, concepts of the nation state, sovereignty, and the balance of power came into currency as the international norm. Britain and France were bi-polar superpower rivals in the 17th and 18th centuries. By the turn of the 20th century, Great Britain, Germany, France,

Japan and the US dominated the multi-polar international scene. In the latter half of the 20th century, the Cold War formed a bi-polar framework in which the US and the USSR possessed the vast majority of political, military, economic and cultural influence on international and regional levels. In this bi-polar system, Western and capitalist states fell under the security umbrella of the US while communist states coalesced around the USSR; and the bi-polar NATO and Warsaw Pacts security alliances did not include the Non-Aligned Movement.

The establishment of the UN introduced a new, supra-national institutional actor to the global scene. International law and norms were codified and legitimized by the UN Charter in 1947 and consolidated by UN member states. Non-interference and collective security have persisted as key principles among the formal international norms proposed for diplomacy and inter-state relations. The distrust inherent in the bi-polar Cold War dynamic motivated the Security Council Permanent Members – whose membership has not changed – to use their veto frequently. Nevertheless, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reduced the intensity of strategic tension with the US in the 1950s, but mistrust within a system of UN “mediated cooperation” remained.

Yan Xuetong wrote the following concerning these issues:

There are thousands of examples of strategic cooperation without mutual trust between major powers throughout human history. Britain established strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union in World War II based on their common interest in fighting against Nazi Germany – even though Winston Churchill detested Joseph Stalin. China and the United States developed it in 1972, even though Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon did not trust each other. Faced with several decades of military confrontation, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals in 1988, which heralded the end of the Cold War. And Jiang Zemin and George W. Bush cooperated on a counter-terrorism campaign just a few months after the collision of Chinese and US military aircraft over the South China Sea in April 2001. Indeed, cooperation is the norm rather than the exception (Xuetong 2013).

Ideological and political alienation between the USSR and China around 1960 presaged the independent rise of China as a potential third superpower. Indeed, as the US and USSR learned to manage their volatile strategic competition during the Cold War, leaders in Washington were keen to prevent China-US relations

slipping from cooperation and competition into an unmanageable state of conflict. With the contemporary global power structure listing towards a return to a bi-polar configuration, international organizations will remain useful for channeling multilateral collaboration by building policy consensus and overseeing initiatives that respond to international needs, crises and conflicts.

ALLIANCES AND MULTILATERALISM

The framework, principles and priorities of the modern international system were conditioned by the limits imposed on members' capabilities after World War II. Postwar international organizations were designed to be sensitive and responsive to the concerns of the members that were most powerful in their domain. For example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council were the victorious allies over the Axis Powers; and no new members have been added to the Security Council "Permanent Five" in spite of a major transformation of the international system. Similarly, and traditionally, only a US citizen can be president of the World Bank and only a European Union citizen can be managing director of the International Monetary Fund.

New international institutions are being established – and new alignments on regional issues are being forged – to generate better practical solutions for global governance and crisis management. For example, when the G8 failed to resolve global economic issues affecting member states, the G20 was founded. When difficulties impeded establishing an East Asian economic sphere of cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established, followed by APEC 10 + 1, 10 + 3, and 10 + 8. Two years ago, Latin American and Caribbean leaders from 33 countries established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as the new regional grouping. In the Caracas Declaration, the signatories committed to intervene in case of regime change through a military coup. Around the same time, in March 2011, the 22-member Arab League joined to ask NATO to establish a no-fly zone during the Libyan Revolution. Violent suppression of Syrian rebels then motivated the Arab League to suspend Syria's membership and impose economic sanctions. China, agreed to the UN Security Council resolution that imposed sanctions and established the no-fly zone, but objected to the Arab League's suspension of Syria based on bilateral and strategic

considerations. These dynamic interactions expose the limits of characterizing the contemporary world as uni-polar, as well as highlight the practical constraints of superpower unilateralism.

AMERICA'S UNI-POLAR HEGEMONY

In the 21st century, the status of the US as the strongest single power on earth is changing. Both China and Russia officially oppose “superpower hegemony,” and have called instead for a multi-polar system to replace US “hegemony”. Today, China, Russia and India are fully integrated into the US-led international political, security, and trading system. China and India feel they are underrepresented and less influential in key international bodies than they should be. Understandably, they desire a greater more influential role for themselves in the international system.

However, pragmatists note that the international system continues to maintain a relative peace in which these proud and ambitious states are able to pursue their national interests and economic development without hindrance. Indeed, China and India, the two most populous and rapidly growing economies on earth, have abandoned their historical demands to radically reform the international system and now support more gradual, practical revisions. To that extent, for them globalization appears to represent an overall positive development.

The 2008 election of President Barack Obama led to a shift away from the security-driven policies and military interventions pursued by his predecessor President George W. Bush. Those policies have been replaced with a studied multilateralism that has improved US ties with its traditional allies and attracted support from other regions for key US-led initiatives. The “smart diplomacy” strategy introduced into US foreign policy has “so far managed to outmaneuver China’s non-alignment policy,” wrote a strategic analyst, “leaving China and Russia without strategic allies to challenge the uni-polar international system.” That is, with only a limited number of potential strategic partners available, the capacity of China and Russia to challenge the US-driven uni-polar system at this time is constrained.

The African continent represents the greatest contemporary challenge and opportunity for great power competition. Both Beijing and Washington see the future of that continent as integral to their own. Interestingly, China and the US both import and export similar products from and to Africa. However, African primary

raw materials exported to China are processed into manufactured goods and then sold primarily to the US and European markets. In this triangle, Africa and China enjoy an overall positive balance of trade which generates trade surpluses in African natural resources exporting countries.

However, the US and China differ in their policy approaches toward investment, trade, aid, security, and energy development in Africa. Investment analysts from emerging markets suggest that Africa may become the next global manufacturing hub. This point was given great emphasis during the US-African Leaders Summit in the summer of 2014. If this development occurs, it would significantly shift both the composition and balance of international trade. Africa currently accounts for a small but growing part of overall US global trade, while the US remains the largest capital stock investor on the continent.

President Obama's 2012 Policy Directive for Africa laid out a strategy aimed not only at increasing the share of trade between Africa and the US, but also at changing the composition of two-way trade. Secretary of State John Kerry noted recently that the US is keen to support Africa's changing global role. Similarly, the US is keen to engage China in competition that benefits workers and consumers in both countries. This approach aims to stimulate intra-continental African trade and commerce to create dynamic incentives for Africans to invest in African manufacturing and commerce to expand and enhance the quality of their access to the US and global markets (Ferchen & Eisenman 2013).

Indeed, Africa may have become the most vital region on earth for China. That is, Africa is uniquely and richly endowed in the diverse strategic and raw materials that China needs at home for its own development. China's three principal economic and trade objectives in Africa are:

- to source essential raw materials needed for its rapid development push;
- to expand its economic presence in the continent through trade and investment; and
- to export finished consumer products and machinery globally.

The strategic objectives of China's trade policy also benefit from the synergies of human and institutional capital growth associated with donor development efforts in Africa.

The recent surge in China's trade and investment in Africa has sparked critical questions about the broader implications of

Chinese business practices. China's policy not to be concerned with or to interfere in issues of national governance, human rights, corruption or the environment has angered local opposition and civil society stakeholders. China's labour practices have also come into conflict with African trade unions and civil society. Chinese oil workers in Ethiopia and the Sudan have been shot and killed. The role of Chinese investments in local mines became election campaign issues recently in Ghana, the Zambia and Zimbabwe. Riots in Cameroun, Ghana and Lesotho targeted Chinese shopkeepers and traditional healers. Angolan workers attacked a residential enclave of workers brought from China to build road and rail infrastructure.

An African critic of China's Africa engagement argued that neither Chinese nor US interests, policy of investments necessarily benefit African communities broadly. China's leadership, sensitive to such criticisms, is quick to remind its critics that China views Africa as an important partner and thus will invest over 500 billion dollars in Africa by 2020.

HARD POWER, SOFT POWER

Political theorist Joseph Nye suggests that effective strategies in contemporary foreign policy require a mix of hard and soft power resources. Chester A. Crocker wrote that smart power "involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy" – essentially the engagement of both military force and all forms of diplomacy (Nye 2012).

Despite the unquestioned primacy of US hard power, effective strategies to address foreign policy challenges will require more than the capacity to project force. Smart power advocates argue that the US needs to mobilize the traditional instruments of soft power, such as public engagement and diplomacy, to inspire and persuade, rather than opt for military threat and force to solve complex international problems. They suggest that the US should creatively engage both old and new constituencies to support the United Nations in order to sustain that organization as a multilateral instrumentality of smart power into the future.

The CSIS Commission on China's "Smart Power Initiative" emphasizes that a US-China partnership is indispensable for addressing many of the global challenges in the twenty-first

century – e.g., global financial stability, proliferation of terrorism, climate change, and energy security. Since 2010, President Obama’s “smart diplomacy” may be out-maneuvering China’s no-questions-asked non-alignment policy in Africa and the developing world. President Obama does not equate the fact of competition with China as inevitably leading to conflict. He, for example, successfully leveraged China’s relationships in the Sudan in order to negotiate support for deploying UN peacekeepers to Darfur. In this sense, the US pursues a range of strategic security, trade and other interests among the various bilateral and multilateral relationships with Russia, China, the EU and other subregional groupings. As a consequence, under President Obama, the US international image and strategic relations with France, Germany, China, Japan, India, Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Nigeria and Mexico have shown great improvement when compared with his predecessor (CSIS Commission on China 2013).

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

There has been little mutual trust between China and the United States in the post-Cold War era. During the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama said this regarding US-China relations: “We still have to do serious work if we are to create the level of mutual trust necessary for long-term cooperation.” That sentiment favouring “mutual trust” was reinforced by President Hu Jintao in June 2013 when he met with President Obama at the White House. China’s foreign ministry called Mr Hu’s visit “an important one”. Spokesman Hong Lei said during the state visit, “We hope the visit will promote positive and cooperative China-US relations, map out new directions for bilateral relations in the new era and raise cooperation to a new level” (BBC, 19 January 2013).

It is evident, however, that the head-to-head superpower disparity between China and the US – in terms of economic, political, military, and other great power instrumentalities – has narrowed. China and the US are expected to spend more than \$100 billion annually on defense over next five years; and they are the only two countries capable of doing so. The “power gap” between the US, China and everybody else will inevitably increase and expand. Over the next 10 years, economic disparities between them and the other major powers will also widen.

Nevertheless, in strategic terms, the US’ status and capabilities as the sole superpower remain formidable. President Obama’s

multilateral approach has improved and expanded positive US ties with traditional allies and allowed the acquisition of new friends and allies. It is unlikely in the current global climate, as was done repeatedly in the past, that the US will demobilize its military capabilities in the wake of a decade of war. Additionally, the quality of US military training, equipment, leadership and war fighting strategies will probably be able to prevail over rival militaries for as far as we can see into the future.

In light of the above, one observer's insights merit consideration, when he wrote:

Yet, the move toward a bi-polar superpower system indicates that the Westphalian system is in decline. Regional powers can now exert their influence in place of a Westphalia-dominated international system. In the foreseeable future, the principles of interference and noninterference will coexist. After the establishment of the United Nations, the concepts of national unity and self-determination have coexisted, becoming the international principles that guide nation states (Xuetong 2011).

Johns Hopkins' David Lampton coined the phrase "same bed, different dreams" to represent the idea that both countries' interests and aspirations are closely related. He argued that for the next 20 years, China and the United States will be engaged in a "double gamble" in which the United States is required to bet that Chinese leaders are more interested in the needs of developing their economy than external aggression and will therefore become "a responsible, decent role model for others". President Barack Obama met his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in early June 2013 to "discuss ways to enhance cooperation" between the two countries (Lampton 2008).

Policy makers and analysts in Washington, DC and other global capitals are positioning their countries to survive and prosper as we all ride the oncoming wave of developments. Contemporary bilateral US-China concerns focus on:

- Peaceful competition for the strategic bilateral relationship;
- Developing positive cooperation when interests converge or overlap;
- Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
- Military collaboration on humanitarian assistance operations
- Direct engagement on international norms guiding cyber security, non-militarization of space, maritime security; and
- Preventive cooperation when their interests conflict (e.g. preventing collisions in South China Sea).

There is evidence to support the claim that a US-China-led bi-polar system already exists; and that US global power and influence have declined since the financial crisis of 2008. Others suggest that China is becoming the anchor state for a multi-polar constellation with India and Russia joining South Africa and Brazil as representatives of emerging global market partners.

Of course, international relations theories provide a great deal of descriptive clarity and explanatory value, but they are not designed to be predictive. As such, one should not be surprised either way. In terms of economic power, the trend towards multipolarity is fading as the world moves increasing toward a US-China bi-polar structure. Yan Xuetong, a Beijing analyst, provides an apt cautionary note:

The worst-case scenario is not that China and the United States will face more strategic conflicts in the coming years, but that they never learn how to develop cooperation based on lack of mutual trust, thus allowing a small conflict to escalate into a major one (Xuetong 2012).

CONCLUSION: UNTIDY BEDS

Contemporary trends harbour the possibility of multiple global power centers in the future with major and minor power players. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the emergence of new centers of power and influence, particularly the rise of China, the EU and India, will continue to test the resilience of the international system. It is also important to emphasize that the European Union, India, Russia, Japan, Brazil and South Africa have become influential regional power centers; and additional partnerships of this type will continue to emerge in order to pursue their particular interests in the international system.

When considering China's expressed policy in this context, one can presume that internal assessments of strategic national interests will ultimately inform Chinese diplomacy and international relations. So, in terms of general trends and likely outcomes, I believe that a decades-long transitional period of unbalanced bi-polarity with diverse multi-polar aspects seems to be the likely next phase. In the evolving bi-polar international system, China will be the principal, but less potent, counterpoise to the USA.

- In terms of economic power, the trend towards multi-polarity is fading as the playing field becomes increasingly dominated by China and the US
- A similar situation will characterize the disposition of military capability, with the US and China on one side and everybody else on the other.
- In terms of cultural influences, China's invitation to thousands of foreign students to study in China, along with sustained outreach policies along with its satellite video programming will generate major power benefits to Beijing.
- But, comparatively, the US lead in soft cultural diplomacy will decline but not be overtaken by China for some time.

In this evolving system, it is difficult to accurately assess whether or not the US and China, as the lead nation states, would meet the definition of a bi-polar model because the two states will not share “similar amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence.” Indeed, I think it is fair to suggest that the US will continue to possess the most “effective potency” across these power dimensions for decades to come.

So, in my speculations about this unbalanced and fluid bi-polar configuration, US qualitative superiority in hard and soft power will persist; but China's capacities will increase sufficiently to challenge and constrain American power – but probably not to replace it.

Alternatively, if another paradigm shift occurs in China's domestic politics that is similar to the transition from Maoist communism to state capitalism, it is conceivable that China and the US could come to share similar policies – i.e., assertive multinational corporate expansion – based on shared interests. Such a convergence of interests, policies and values would allow them to form a partnership that could dominate world affairs for a very long time.

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OUTBOUND *China and* the Global South

New Entrepreneurial Immigrants in the Eastern Caribbean

CECILIA A. GREEN

Abstract • This paper examines the new role of 'Global China' in the Anglophone Caribbean, particularly in the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, both from the point of view of bilateral Chinese state development aid and investment and from the point of view of the parallel or convergent flows of private entrepreneurial Chinese immigrants (and linked labour migrants) into the region over the last 15–20 years. This new presence has to be seen in the context of (a) China's outbound state capitalism and growing role as a global development agent, particularly in the countries of the Global South, (b) the 'post'-neoliberal development vacuum in the Caribbean (as in many countries of the Global South) and the relative attractiveness of the Chinese development assistance model, and (c) the importance of the region as a theatre for the diplomatic contest between China and Taiwan. Preliminary field work in Dominica and St. Kitts animates the discussion of the larger contexts.

Keywords Chinese immigrants • Caribbean • entrepreneur
• global spatial-circuits

LOCATING THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN EXPERIENCE WITHIN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

This paper comes out of a larger research project whose purpose is to examine the new role of 'Global China' in the Anglophone Caribbean, particularly in the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, from the point of view of both (a) bilateral Chinese state development aid and investment, and (b) the simultaneous or convergent flows of private entrepreneurial Chinese immigrants (and related or accompanying labour migrants) into the region. In this paper I focus on (b), the second aspect. Despite the frequent

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assumption that the private immigrant flows are directly connected to the Chinese state presence, they are, in fact, as much in evidence in Taiwan aligned islands as they are in those islands whose governments have switched allegiance to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The overwhelming majority of recent ethnic Chinese immigrants in all the Caribbean territories are from mainland China regardless of diplomatic alignments. There is no question that the simultaneous flows of Chinese developmental capital and aspiring Chinese merchants are mutually connected to the globalization of China and its multifaceted 'outbound' trajectory since the late 1980s. However, aspiring Chinese merchants do not require the physical presence of a Chinese embassy in their quest to activate transnational entrepreneurial networks, with China at the center of their supply system.

Indeed, there has been as much speculation as there has been research about the relationship between Chinese state and Chinese private immigrant presence in the countries of the Global South. Some have alleged that the individual emigrant flow is state-sponsored and is part of an elaborate official scheme of global encroachment and colonization. Huynh et al. (2010:287) cite the example of the award-winning British journalist, Andrew Malone, who warns that the "invasion" of Africa by China has been occurring "secretly" through the movement of Chinese people to the continent. Indeed, we found enough evidence in our own research to suggest that this view is fairly well entrenched in the popular imagination, although often in competition or coexistence with other views. China is accused both of imperialist designs in its quest for global supremacy and of being motivated by desperation to solve its overpopulation problem and feed its people and its insatiable industry.

Other analyses have been more sober in their assessment of the ongoing exodus from China and the circumstances of its acceleration in the last 25 years. Much research on Chinese migration to Africa, for example, sets out to interrogate the argument that the movement of people is essentially part of a Chinese state project or 'plot'. "There is no state agenda," says Giles Mohan (The China Africa Project, online). Huynh et al. (2010:286) aver that "the vast majority of new Chinese migrants in South Africa arrived (or made decisions to stay) independently, motivated by their desires to improve their lives". They insist that "the new Chinese migrants are not taking over Africa as Malone suggests... neither are they flag-toting agents of the state" (Huynh

et al. 2010:290). However, they clearly recognize that “the migrants’ decisions to migrate, destination choices, and relations with local host societies are intimately entangled with Chinese state policies and processes” (Huynh et al. 2010:290). Ma Mung (Kuang)’s work on Chinese immigrants in Africa tends to support this conclusion. He and others have pointed out the diverse sources of Chinese migration and clarified the distinction between temporary labour migrations associated with public works financed by the Chinese state and class-differentiated private migrations of merchants and workers. According to him, the Chinese government has evolved a pro-diaspora policy which calls on overseas Chinese to “serve the country from abroad” and encourages inter-diaspora networking among themselves and with China (Ma Mung 2008; see also Ma Mung Kuang, 2008).

An increasing number of researchers are focusing their investigation on the dual roles of Chinese state (as donor and investor) and private immigrant entrepreneur, particularly the small and medium enterprise (SME) merchant, in poorer countries of the Global South. Among the most important scholars pursuing these very questions today is anthropologist Pál Nyíri, whose work has centered both the emergence of a new “transnational middleman minority” in “poor” and “transitional” economies and how the Chinese state has shifted from a more or less anti-immigration stance before the 1980s to a position which “celebrat[es] migration itself as a patriotic and modern act, thus encouraging transnational practices among people who are in the process of, or just preparing for, leaving China” (Nyíri 2001:635, 2011, 2012, 2013). According to Nyíri (2011:145), after 1989, entrepreneurial migration from China developed on a mass scale, with “these new entrepreneurial migrants going to countries with no recent tradition of Chinese immigration, but where there was high demand for low-cost consumer goods produced by China and a lax regulatory environment”. This new group relied on the flexible activation of transnational networks with their native China – as a sustaining source of labour, merchandise, and capital – in establishing SME businesses in poor or economically vulnerable countries typically undergoing a transition from socialist or postcolonial state-directed development to more liberalized free-market economies. While focusing on select cases in his own research, Nyíri has found evidence of such “transnational middleman minorities” or transnational ethnic entrepreneurial circuits in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America, all located within the

context of the state-capitalist global expansion of China. He has also presented compelling evidence of the careful and deliberate cultivation of synergies between Chinese state transnationalism and migrant transnationalism (see especially Nyíri 2012), without drawing sensationalistic conclusions about a sinister state conspiracy.

Case studies generally matching Nyíri's criteria have been offered by Haugen and Carling (2006) for Cape Verde and Lin (2014) for South Africa. Resonating most strongly with the small-island Caribbean experience is the case of Cape Verde, a “non-traditional” Chinese migrant destination, which has seen a “surge” of immigrant Chinese “*baihuo*” [general merchandise] merchants moving into the modest private sector of the cities. According to Haugen and Carling (2006:642), “a conspicuous component” of the post-1980s Chinese emigration “has been what can be called the new entrepreneurial migration.” Moreover, they note, “[t]his migration flow also includes workers who are not entrepreneurs themselves but who work for relatives and often aspire to become self-employed in the same line of business.” The authors point out that “Chinese entrepreneurs have so far established themselves in Cape Verde independently of the Chinese state (the PRC)” (Haugen and Carling 2006:650). (While this appears to mirror the case of St. Kitts-Nevis discussed below, multiple and diverse informants in that island made claims – uncorroborated – about direct Chinese state sponsorship and financing of local immigrant merchants, despite the lack of a diplomatic presence.)

Similar circumstances of entrepreneurial migration have been documented by Lin (2014), who presents the case of what he calls “small pond migration” from more developed to less developed countries. According to him, “[t]he small pond migration strategy is where *migrants move from a more developed place to a lesser developed country or region to take advantage of characteristics of the receiving place, which effectively increase their existing social, economic, and human capital*” (p. 189, italics in original). He points out that “in small pond migration, migrants focus on advancing their *socioeconomic status* [rather than their location], moving to areas where they can maximize the effectiveness of their existing capital”. Indeed, “[w]hen Chinese migrants explain their choice to move, the fact that South Africa is less developed is the very reason for wanting to go there” (p. 189). Lin explains that these migrants, many of whom were uneducated and/or did not have previous experience in business, typically would not be competitive in

China, where they would be small and insignificant fish in a big pond, and that by migrating to a less developed and less crowded economy they consciously seek to become “big fish in a small pond” (pp. 189, 197). His respondents cited the pressure and high cost of living in China, and “approximated the cost of opening a shop in South Africa as about four times cheaper than in China because of cheaper rent and lack of government regulations” (p. 208). Other points of attraction to South Africa (despite the high crime rate which took away some of their freedoms) were the slower pace of life and the more favourable weather.

Inspired in part by such case studies, my co-researcher¹ and I specifically chose to zero in on the private entrepreneurial immigrant niche as a way of understanding both how it sustains and reproduces itself and how it is related to larger push-pull questions. Below, in considering these questions, I discuss some of the key elements that might go into the construction of an overarching conceptual framework within which to locate the study of Chinese entrepreneurial migration to the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean – specifically those making up the anglophone Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE ENTREPRENEURIAL MIGRANTS IN THE CARIBBEAN

In foregrounding the role of the Chinese, in terms of both state-level development, financial, and diplomatic investment in the region on the one hand, and immigrant flows on the other, it is important to pay proper and separate attention to the relatively autonomous development and demographic trajectories of the host societies into which they insert themselves, otherwise an inaccurate and distorted picture will emerge. This is particularly important because of the sometimes exaggerated and one-sided discourse around the presence of China and Chinese that abounds in the social media in particular, in which other ‘new’ private immigrant presences (especially American and European) fade into the background, obscuring a larger and more balanced view. Still, this attention cannot entail a simple focus on the ‘local’ as a passive space of reception (a receptacle) and must instead show how the host economy/polity generates and produces its own conditions of interaction with Chinese development aid/investment and Chinese immigrants, within the context of multiple

interactions and transnational flows constituting and reconstituting the domestic social formation. Therefore the research project on which this paper is based can be said to unfold at the intersection of three – what I will call – “spatial-circuits”, to all of which due attention must be paid, although the last mentioned is intended to ultimately occupy center-stage and provide the vantage-point from which articulations with the others are understood:

- Spatial-circuit of Global China’s outbound development and investment capital (political and economic) networks and operations in countries of the Global South/Caribbean: Where and how does the Caribbean fit into China’s global development practices?
- Spatial-circuits of Global South/Caribbean countries’ inbound (a) development assistance, investment, and partnership networks, and (b) human capital in-migrant flows: Where do China and Chinese immigrants fit into the Caribbean’s official and unofficial development trajectory?
- Spatial-circuit of private immigrant/diasporic Chinese entrepreneurial and connected familial and labour networks: How does the Caribbean become a nodal position and location in the cultivation of a transnational ethnic entrepreneurial network?

The term “spatial-circuit” is borrowed from a previous deployment of the concept, by which I attempted to account for the key circuits making up the disarticulated and dependent Caribbean economy: the “household-domestic”, the “domestic-national”, and the (typically foreign-controlled) “transnational-enclave” (Green 1995:85-88). The concept is applied somewhat differently here. All three spatial-circuits in this context involve varying local/global articulations and are constituted by a set of relations, processes, and practices which acquire and generate a certain grounded materiality in ‘place’. Their effects in place (their local and locational effects) can be better comprehended when approached through the perspective of intersecting trans/national spatial-circuits with a logic of their own (which take on a particular materiality in interaction with other relations and circuits in place, but which go beyond the local). Thus, on the site of a typical Eastern Caribbean location, there is a three-way intersection among the “spatial-circuit” of China’s outbound “development aid-and-investment” trajectory, the “spatial-circuit” of the island-state’s inbound development partnership operations and regulated

and unregulated migrant flows, and the “spatial-circuit” of private immigrant Chinese transnational entrepreneurial networks. It is important to maintain a sense of both the relative autonomy of each spatial-circuit and their *in situ* mutual interaction.

The larger research plan is to conduct a thorough enquiry into two OECS islands which are diplomatically aligned with the PRC and two whose diplomatic ties are with Taiwan. The idea is therefore to add an element of comparison and to evaluate the relative in/dependence of the private immigrant spatial-circuit with regard to home state foreign policy and migration policy influences. One of the defining characteristics of the four research islands that should be mentioned at the outset is that none of them boasts a pre-existing Chinese diaspora based on the nineteenth-century indentured labour migrations that were commissioned to fill post-emancipation labour vacuums in the dominant sugar plantation sectors of the British Caribbean. Such diasporas, of course, exist in the larger territories of Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana (and especially Cuba in the Hispanic Caribbean), the principal destinations of the colonial era Chinese indentured migrant stream (Look Lai 1993). Research considerations for these territories might well require due modifications or adjustments.

Zeroing in on the transnational entrepreneurial spatial-circuit, we ask the following questions:

- What are the profiles of these private entrepreneurial immigrants? By what means, local and transnational, capital and labour related, do they sustain their host/Caribbean based enterprises as well as their personal/familial/legal conditions of residency and settlement (or their ‘diasporic lifeworlds’)? Do their profiles differ depending on whether diplomatic ties are with China (PRC) or Taiwan? And, what is the nature of their impact on and interaction with local economies and societies?

From the point of view of economic logic, the growing body of literature on “transnational entrepreneurship” has been among the most helpful in providing effective working concepts to advance this investigation. Chen and Tan (2009:1079) see transnational entrepreneurship (TE) research as located somewhere “at the intersection of the ethnic entrepreneurship (EE) and the international entrepreneurship (IE) literature”. They define transnational entrepreneurs as “immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct border-crossing business activities” (p. 1080). Despite their apparent focus on “ethnic” immigrant entrepreneurs in the

Global North and their more quantitatively structured methods of generating data, they come up with a number of conceptual tools that are easily transposable to other contexts and flexible in the way they can be applied. The prime ones we want to take away for our own purposes are their multidimensional “network approach” and the related concept of “glocalization”, combined in the notion of “glocalized networks”. According to them, “TE opens a new frontier to develop insights on the structure and impact of glocalized networks – networks with both local and global connection[s] – since both migration and entrepreneurship are boundary-crossing processes” (p. 1080). They see their approach as providing “an integrative framework that takes into account factors at the macro, meso, and micro levels, and articulates the interplay of glocalized networks with both local and global connections and TE” (p. 1081). At the macro level, their framework “calls for attention to institutional contexts, especially how state policies in the host and home countries shape the network resources and opportunity structure for transnational entrepreneurship” and, at the micro or individual level, it “takes into account factors such as human capital, cultural capital, and immigration experience” (p. 1082). Insisting on a perspective which very much mirrors our own in certain critical respects, they elaborate:

Linking macro- and micro-level factors at the meso level, we introduce the concept of ‘glocalized networks – a network characteristic that is especially relevant to transnational entrepreneurs but has not received much attention. Challenging the ‘deterritorialization’ or the ‘death of geography’ thesis that highlights how the local is overwhelmed or homogenized by the global, the term ‘glocalization’ is used to capture the multiple outcomes of the interaction between the local and the global (p. 1082).

The focus here is not so much on a long established diaspora in which immigrant entrepreneurs assume a transnational scope in their core activities, using home/host connections, but on the very process of creating a new diaspora using entrepreneurial means, so that the meaning of transnational entrepreneurship is stretched here somewhat to include a variety of conditions of settlement into and installation of an ethnic immigrant entrepreneurial niche in the Caribbean, and not just enterprises whose core activities compel an ongoing transnational commercial network. The circumstances of new Chinese *immigrant settlement* in the islands, whether as owner or worker, are overwhelmingly related

to the ethnic entrepreneurial niche. This niche brings together immigrants of different statuses, not only owner and worker but also different kinds of owners, as suggested by the examples below. What is common to this niche is its enclave character. As Harrison et al. (2010:904) remind us, “[w]ith businesses structured around the family, Chinese migrants largely avoid dependence on the labor and skills of the host society”.

I propose to adapt Chen and Tan’s notion of “glocalized networks” connecting the global and local at the meso level in a framework centring the spatial-circuit of the immigrant group within a larger context that can also account for the two other spatial-circuits with which it intersects. This framework would include three levels of determination, with the “meso” or intermediate level of “glocalization” being key to the sustainment of the immigrant enterprise: (a) Conditions of Globalization, (b) Conditions of Glocalization, and (c) Conditions of Localization:

- CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION:
 - China’s ‘outbound capitalism’ and political and developmental global diplomacy; ‘Go Global’ (‘going out’) and ‘One China’ policies
 - Entrepreneurial and labour migrations: state facilitated or independent?
 - Host country development needs and incentives programmes; development deficits; alternatives to Western neoliberalism; new regional and global alignments and development partnerships
- CONDITIONS OF GLOCALIZATION:
 - Conditions of settlement and installation; formation of glocal (home/host/other) entrepreneurial networks, transnational circuits of reproduction (both commercial [capital/labour/market] and personal/familial; informal and formal patronage [home/host] resources; legal residency/ citizenship considerations)
- CONDITIONS OF LOCALIZATION:
 - Attitudes towards and from host society: government, private sector, consumers, labour, social media. Ethnic enclavization? Transience or permanence? Trajectories of residence/citizenship/entrepreneurial expansion? Children’s lives, generational transitions, process of embedment in local social networks? Restructuring impact on local economies and societies?

To briefly sum up the conceptualization process thus far: first, I have identified the intersecting fields of actors, practices, and relations – or spatial-circuits – that come together at the nodal point of our research problem. Next, I centered and anchored the spatial-circuit of transnational immigrant ethnic entrepreneurs within the articulated intersections of local-global processes through the concept of “glocalized networks” adapted from Chen and Tan’s (2009) intervention into the transnational entrepreneurial (TE) research literature. Finally, I have suggested that these globalized networks are constituted at three levels of co-determination – the global, the glocal, and the local, with the glocal being the central self-inventive process of new transnational entrepreneurial circuits.

Below, I provide selected findings from preliminary research which has been conducted in the island-nations of Dominica, diplomatically aligned with the PRC, and St. Kitts-Nevis (SKN), diplomatically aligned with Taiwan. These findings are suggestive and illustrative only and are not meant to fit precisely and purposively into the conceptual framework offered above, which would be beyond the scope of this short paper. They include aspects of the local reception of the new immigrant presence as well as individual immigrant-entrepreneur profiles, elements of which support the idea of the formation of “glocalized networks” sustaining a transnational commercial and kin-based circuit.

THE NEW CHINESE IMMIGRANTS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN: LOCAL RECEPTION

Owing to the newness of the phenomenon and to the fragmented nature of the evidence at hand, speculation about the total numbers of Chinese immigrants – particularly PRC nationals – forming part of the new (post-1980s) wave to the Caribbean region has not yet become a common media or academic exercise. When we visited Dominica in August 2012, we spoke to a Chinese Embassy official who placed the number of resident Chinese immigrants in Dominica at around 100 (Dominica interviews, 2012). In a July 15, 2013 posting on Sina Weiba (the Chinese equivalent of Twitter), the Chinese Embassy of Dominica released figures which placed the precise number of Chinese resident in Dominica at 142, with the following breakdowns: 98 overseas Chinese (or Chinese nationals), 41 ethnic Chinese without Chinese citizenship, and 3 Taiwanese (<http://e.weibo.com>, trans. Yan Liu). In St. Kitts in June 2013,

informal conversations with a number of Chinese immigrants put the estimate at 200 for just St. Kitts – excluding its sister-island of Nevis (St. Kitts interviews, 2013). This number is more likely to represent an under count than an over count, but it is impossible to confirm given the paucity of records (and the reluctance on the part of some government officials to allow access to these records).

As predominantly *entrepreneurial and related immigrants*, however, the Chinese population's impact belies its small numbers. It is noteworthy that numbers of Haitian immigrants in Dominica and Dominican Republic immigrants in SKN are much larger, but they occupy an acutely different socioeconomic niche. In Dominica, private sector representatives mentioned an informal survey they had carried out which revealed 48 Chinese establishments in Roseau alone (Dominica interviews, 2012). The July 2013 figures released on Sina Weiba claimed that there were 29 Chinese households running 42 shops and enterprises, and employing 115 local people. Given the small size of the private sector and its concentration in the main town of Roseau, these numbers represent a significant presence. In St. Kitts, immigrant Chinese entrepreneurs are prominent in the two niches in which they appear to specialize: supermarkets and restaurants. Indeed, they own the largest *number* of supermarkets in Basseterre, if not the largest and most important ones, which are owned by long established local level conglomerates.

Before sharing a few pertinent details of the immigrant stories we have been able to gather so far, it is necessary to provide some context for this 'new presence' in the two islands. St. Kitts and Dominica have had somewhat different colonial and postcolonial trajectories, based in part on the divergent locations they occupied along the spectrum of the plantation economy model of development. Dominica was a marginal plantation economy with several hybrid features that intensified in the post-emancipation period particularly in the direction of a peasant or small farmer mode of production, while St. Kitts was part of a cluster of islands whose features provided the foundational principles for the classic sugar plantation economy typology (Green 1999, 2001). A historic feature of postcolonial development in St. Kitts was the takeover of the sugar plantations by the populist-nationalist Labour Party government, which placed the commanding heights of the economy and most of the productive land in the island under centralized state control. This put the government in the fairly unique position of being able to almost singlehandedly chart

the development course of the island economy, at least from the vantage-point of local agency (which has clear limits within the hegemonic global system). For both Dominica and St. Kitts, the end of preferential regimes for bananas and sugar has led, respectively, to post-small farmer and post-plantation development options which appear to include the abandonment or neglect of (or, in any event, the movement away from) agriculture in favour of tourism, services, and 'offshore'-type development (facilitated by economic citizenship programmes in both islands).

The private immigrant Chinese community in SKN, while also by and large a post-1980s phenomenon, appears to be not only somewhat larger than the one in Dominica but also of longer vintage and different origins, many of them having come by way of St. Maarten/St. Martin. A number of informants mentioned the deep ties of patronage exchange between the Labour party/government and at least one prominent immigrant business family group on the island. At the same time, one government officer/public servant declined my (perhaps unclearly conveyed) request for data on 'the new Chinese presence' since, according to him, "most of the Chinese businesses here receive some form of assistance from mainland China", placing any information pertinent to the matter beyond his purview (email correspondence).

As already indicated, such strong convictions about PRC financing of private Chinese entrepreneurs in SKN were also encountered in the private sector. Alleged secret PRC financing of Chinese businesses and alleged ties of patronage between these businesses and the local government prompted the question of Taiwan's position in all of this. A representative to whom we spoke specifically mentioned Taiwanese displeasure at the "cosy relationship" that appeared to exist with Chinese businesspersons (St. Kitts interviews, 2013). Similar, but more diffuse, claims about close ties with the Chinese business community were made for the Skerrit government and the governing party in Dominica as well. In a radio broadcast on October 3, 2013, the Executive Director of the St. Kitts-Nevis Chamber of Industry and Commerce openly excoriated what he saw as unfair competition from immigrant Chinese retail merchants, contrasting their behaviour with that of Taiwan: "Taiwan has been here for thirty years and has never engaged in that type of direct competition against our little people, and we admire them for that, and we support them and encourage their continued assistance and cooperation with us" (<http://www.winnfm.com/news/local/5768-chinese-retail-competition-a>

major-concern). In the same radio broadcast, Dominican Atherton Martin, “a hotelier and former government minister” and a frequent critic of the establishment, complained of the “ridiculously low prices in the Chinese stores” and their “really really poor quality products”. He blamed the negative impact on local businesses on the short-sightedness of the Chambers of Commerce in the region, which “need[ed] to be more proactive in protecting their membership” (<http://www.winnfm.com/news/local/5768-chinese-retail-competition-a-major-concern>).

Private sector reactions to immigrant Chinese merchant operations in both islands have been quite pronounced and often openly adversarial. Among the grievances or charges advanced in both Dominica and St. Kitts, the following were prominent: unfair competition from cheap Chinese imports leading to closure of local businesses; covert financing (including rental payments on behalf of Chinese businesses) by the PRC government; non-payment of VAT (value-added taxes) from business revenues; under-invoicing of incoming goods; poor quality and unsafe products; local government protection and coddling of Chinese businesses; non-compliance with labour laws: illegal importation of workers from China, lack of proper work permits, slave-like conditions of employment; enclave-like operations, including no employment or rare employment of locals; little evidence of “corporate social responsibility” or “social outreach” (Interviews with private sector representatives in Dominica and St. Kitts, 2012, 2013).

One private sector organization official in Dominica carefully tempered these charges with a number of observations. He mentioned the cultural and language barriers that hampered Chinese integration into local business protocols and networks. He pointed to the fact that “locals also don’t comply, so we can’t discriminate against the Chinese”, and to the *laissez-faire* attitudes of the government, which has refused to respond to private sector calls for proper and transparent orientation of the immigrant entrepreneurs to local corporate tax and labour laws and Bureau of Standards regulations, as well as for an investigation into violations.

He also admitted that many consumers “*like the Chinese*”; specifically, they liked the prices, the “one-stop shop” experience, the easy exchange policies, and the fact that they are sometimes allowed to negotiate. He suggested that Chinese businesses were enabling a certain section of the consumer market in Dominica to gain access to previously unattainable middle class goods and

lifestyles. This view was echoed by a labour representative in St. Kitts who spoke more pointedly of “opposing views” on the Chinese – those of established businessmen and those of the consumer. Among the things he claimed the consumers appreciated were Sunday opening hours (which had “started a trend”) and the fact that the Chinese offered reliable and prompt service. In a way, he provided an important counterpoint to the notion that the Chinese were not well integrated into the community by pointing to instances of their eager accommodation to the needs of their customers, both culturally and commercially.

A fuller investigation of these and other local responses to the Chinese immigrants is clearly needed. Justice cannot be done to this important question within the scope and spatial confines of this paper. None of our Dominican based respondents (including the Chinese to whom we spoke), for example, made reference to a 2011 donation by “the Chinese business community in Dominica” of EC\$30,000 in building materials to a local primary school for facility upgrades. This donation had been announced “at a ceremony under the patronage of the Chinese Ambassador to Dominica”, suggesting a conscious public relations strategy (*Dominica News Online*, June 23, 2011). Indeed, individual Chinese informants appeared to corroborate public perceptions of their aloofness from local life, and they all (in both islands) responded negatively – from all accounts, accurately so – to questions about the existence of local Chinese business organizations. The full implications of all of this can only be revealed through further research on the ground.

IMMIGRANT PROFILES: A NEW TRANSNATIONAL ENTREPRENEURIAL NICHE?

Ethnic Chinese migration to Dominica began primarily under the aegis of the Economic Citizenship Programme instituted in 1993 by the government of Eugenia Charles, whose diplomatic ties were with Taiwan. Most applicants appear to have been ethnic Chinese from Taiwan, with a mix of Hong Kong and PRC nationals. While some of the economic citizens were investors (in the hotel sector and duty-free jewellery stores), and some were resident (small merchants), most were passport seekers in transit to northern destinations. The Chinese Embassy official who spoke to us in August 2012 pointed out that most of the Taiwanese or other earlier economic citizens had left, and that the current immigrants

were PRC nationals who for the most part wanted to retain their Chinese citizenship and did not appear to have an interest in economic citizenship. The numbers recently provided by the embassy both confirm and challenge this assessment, since they indicate that nearly 29% of current Chinese residents do not or no longer have Chinese citizenship. It is not clear if this represented a trend towards taking out (either economic or regular) Dominican citizenship.

The origins of the recent Chinese settlers in St. Kitts appear to be less formal and 'state-sanctioned', especially given lack of ties of citizenship and political nationality to Taiwan, SKN's diplomatic ally. There is a St. Maarten connection which needs to be further explored in terms of *its* origins, but a fair number of the Chinese immigrants to whom we spoke reported coming directly from China. Peculiarities of the St. Kitts community also include extended family business networks within and across multiple island-sites (St. Kitts, Nevis, and St. Maarten), a preference for investing in supermarkets and restaurants, and a predominance of Cantonese-speaking immigrants from the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. In Dominica provincial origins of settlers appeared to be much more diverse and enterprises were also more varied, selling various and miscellaneous kinds of consumer goods, but including small manufacturing concerns such as a water bottling plant and a window assembly operation.

Mr. Y, a young businessman in Dominica since 2005, furnishes a perfect example as a generator of "glocalized networks" involving transnational family and business ties and transactions, though on an informal and small scale. Mr. Y, a college graduate from a coastal province in China, wanted to "go abroad and see how it goes" and was encouraged by his father, with whom he was having conflicts, to join his (father's) friend who had a business in Dominica. Having done so, he soon opened up his own business selling small electronic home appliances and was successful enough to open up a second shop in another part of the island. Both Mr. Y's family and his business are 'reproduced' and sustained transnationally. He had married his high school sweetheart three years before (in 2009). She helped with the business, but when she got pregnant she went back to China to give birth (reportedly to take advantage of the better healthcare system); then returned to Dominica, leaving her child behind in the care of her parents, to be raised by them for an unspecified period. China was also the source of merchandise stocks and of workers. Every year Mr. Y and his wife

made separate trips, once in early spring and once in summer, to purchase stocks that were shipped out in a single container on each occasion. Mr. Y had also brought in workers from China, whom he paid about US\$7,500 a year, provided with food and a place to stay, and a return air ticket to and from China every three years. It had proven to be too expensive and the recruits did not meet his preference for college graduates. He currently employed local cashiers and one Chinese man to manage his warehouse. His friendships and leisure activities were all with other Chinese. In response to our general question about ties to the local Chinese embassy (we did not ask for specifics), he confirmed that Chinese embassies could be of help to overseas Chinese.

In St. Kitts, where there was no PRC embassy to (potentially) offer direct assistance ‘in the flesh’, there was far greater evidence of extended family entrepreneurial networks, suggesting a deeper level of settlement and perhaps a greater degree of localization, despite bitter complaints that Chinese immigrant companies “do not do social outreach or fund local projects” (St. Kitts interviews, 2013). One sometimes did get the impression that the St. Kitts Chinese were a more ‘self-made’ group, but any support for this is still too conjectural. Two questions, however, might be asked: Does the presence of a Chinese embassy exercise a kind of disciplinary function (apart from the alleged supportive function) with respect to local ‘overseas Chinese’ communities, especially in a small-island context? Conclusions from African research appear split between evidence of incentivized outreach to and support of overseas Chinese business communities by local embassies and reports of a total lack of awareness or even derisive dismissal or skepticism on the part of immigrant entrepreneurs of anything the local embassy might have to offer. The other question has to do with local private sector attitudes. Do local business associations feel under greater pressure to formalize or normalize ‘fraternal’ relations with immigrant Chinese businesses when a Chinese presence is ‘sanctioned’, so to speak, by formal diplomatic ties? The contrast that inspired this question may be entirely coincidental, since cries of foul by local businesspersons against perceived Chinese ‘interlopers’ have resounded equally loudly in St. Kitts and Dominica.² However, while the Dominica business association officials to whom we spoke claimed that they had made formal overtures and extended invitations (however circumspect or guarded) to the Chinese business community, their St. Kitts counterpart evinced a clear disdain for the Chinese merchants

(based on alleged illegal practices, including smuggling) and flat out rejected the idea of including them as “legitimate” members of the local business association (Dominica interviews, 2012; St. Kitts interviews, 2013). It was not clear how representative of the organization as a whole this attitude was.

We were able to trace at least portions of two families’ networks across multiple businesses in St. Kitts, Nevis, and St. Maarten. At the center of the first family network (Case #1) were Mr. and Mrs. X, who own two supermarkets and an air conditioning repair service in Basseterre. A brother of Mr. X’s and his wife own a restaurant in Basseterre; another brother owns a supermarket and restaurant in Nevis; and another close relative owns a business in St. Maarten. Mrs. X’s brother and his wife own a restaurant in Basseterre, and this sister-in-law’s brother owns a restaurant in Nevis. Case #2 involves an enterprising couple with separate businesses – hers, a booming beauty supply business and his, a supermarket, both in Basseterre. The couple also owns a wholesale business in St. Maarten, according to her brother, who himself (with his wife) owns a restaurant in Basseterre. A family member of the husband owns a business in St. Maarten.

Both these family networks were constituted through a process of chain migration. Despite Ma Mung’s (2008:98) observation that “[i]t is rare for an immigrant to arrive as a laborer and then establish himself as a tradesman after several years”, we did find instances of such a transition (as other researchers in Africa have found). It was reported, for example, that Mr. X used to drive a van for a business in St. Maarten. Moreover, the change in status from worker to owner was sometimes the trigger for the generation of a chain. However, it was also clear, in support of Ma Mung’s observation, that this was not the destined path for most of the workers we encountered, and that the worker-to-boss trajectory in particular was quite uncommon.

Relatedly, there was a range of resident and citizenship statuses, from that of short-term illegal worker to non-citizen – ‘glocally’ connected – merchant, as in the case of Mr. Y above. In contrast to the alleged indifference of the Dominican group to the acquisition of Dominican citizenship, there appeared to be a preoccupation with legalization of domestic status among the Chinese immigrants to whom we spoke in St. Kitts. Socioeconomic differences were evident in the decision to purchase economic citizenship, as was made by the Case #2 couple mentioned above, as opposed to waiting out the time period required to qualify for naturalization,

which was the path taken by settlers like the young man in St. Kitts who had sent for his parents after working for others for eight years. An entirely different case was that of Mr. and Mrs. Z. Mr. Z had acquired Dominican economic citizenship over ten years before, but like so many others, had used it as a stepping stone to gain entry into Canada where he worked in the food service industry for a number of years. About five years previously, he had married Mrs. Z, who was from his hometown in China. They came to Dominica where they first partnered with someone else to start a restaurant. They subsequently sold their interest in that restaurant and opened up their own. They had two children, born in China, who were with them in Dominica. Mrs. Z currently held a work permit but was planning to apply for Dominican citizenship after the qualifying residency period. They had no immediate plans to return to China. They had brought over three relatives to help them in the restaurant, and were planning to hire locals once their family assistants had gone back, as they were expected to. According to Mrs. Z, their future depended on the success of the restaurant.

Accounts of worker experiences were similar across the two islands. Workers' lives were inextricably tied to their employers' enterprises, with very little access to independent space or time. They had almost no connection to local life and often did not venture out after work. Multiple workers, such as those employed by Mr. X, lived together, and sometimes included married couples. It was not unusual for them to live on the premises, where residential space was or could be incorporated. They were paid low salaries – *especially for the hours worked*³ – and were provided with free food and accommodation. In St. Kitts a handful of workers reported monthly wages ranging from US\$900, with tips, to US\$1,000. We were unable to confirm whether these were typical or not. One labour union representative in St. Kitts told us of reports of Chinese businesses evading work permit requirements by claiming the workers that they bring in as 'family'. In Dominica, one worker, a distant relative of his employer (the owner of multiple businesses) whom he calls "aunt", would not reveal his salary, except to say "not much". According to him, most of his salary goes directly to China and he receives a small allowance every month. Working hours reported to us (again, by a handful of workers) ranged from extremely long days (8:00 a.m. to 10 p.m., with a one-hour meal break) to shorter business days (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.), outside of which, however, the worker might be constantly on call for other kinds

of work, e.g. ancillary business activities or home construction (Dominica interviews, 2012; St. Kitts interviews, 2013).

CONCLUSION

In considering the larger role of China in the Caribbean, a focus on the new private mercantile immigrant presence yields a number of significant insights: (i) these actors constitute an accessible, situated, flesh-and-blood representation and dimension of the Chinese presence in the Caribbean and a key link to the conditions and circumstances of outbound China, and as such they have a lot to teach us about the latter (and we can also get at the question: What is the nature of any continuing relationship between the Chinese state and the private immigrants?); (ii) they form, through their glocalised networks, “transnational social fields” which are a key sustaining dimension of globalization today and which need to be closely understood as a set of practices and relations that complicates the politics and economics of locality and situated lifeworlds (see Levitt and Schiller 2004); (iii) their precise niche in, relationship to, and impact on Caribbean economies and societies need to be properly understood, in both positive and negative permutations. Furthermore, how are they becoming ‘localized’ in and being reinvented by/in these societies, and how are they in turn reshaping the contours of these societies? What do their practices and constitutive achievements tell Caribbean people about the way their own societies are structured?

The contribution of this paper has been both specific, in terms of detailing some of the empirical features of the historically recent phenomenon of the “new Chinese presence in the Caribbean”, and general, in terms of locating the phenomenon within the larger context of the growth of China originated and centered “transnational middleman minorities” in countries of the Global South, as well as in terms of constructing a conceptual framework which might be useful in guiding the path of researchers investigating the phenomenon. The hope is that it helps to document the unfolding of a new chapter in Eastern Caribbean society and history on the one hand and adds to the growing conceptual and empirical literature on the role of outbound China and Chinese migrants in the Global South on the other.

Notes

1. The project was undertaken with Sociology graduate student and research assistant, Yan Liu, and with initial funding from the Office of the Dean, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. Both are gratefully acknowledged here.
2. In April 2012, the CEO of the Dominica Association of Industry and Commerce (DAIC), a returnee who had lived in Canada for several decades, was pressured to resign following a controversy surrounding his vigorous defense of Chinese merchants (against charges of government favoritism and “unfair advantages”) as likely to be economic citizens and therefore “Dominicans like the native-born entrepreneurs with an equal right to conduct business affairs in Dominica” (*Dominica News Online*, 2012).
3. The face value of the wages received is not necessarily lower when considered against those paid locally to comparable low-level service workers. However, one would have to work out the opportunity cost of these wages by weighing things like non-payment of taxes, free food and housing, hours worked, non-receipt of as well as non-payment for Social Security benefits, and the value of alternatives foregone in their home provinces of China, etc.

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MAN *and* Time

China, Jamaica and the Caribbean

COURTNEY A. HOGARTH

Abstract • This article provides an unconventional exploration of the concept of hegemony. It examines hegemony through the broader perspective of man and time, by conducting an inward analysis of the differing social value systems of Jamaica and China. The paper positions each country in the present global space in which they exist. It concludes by repositioning the construct of hegemony through the advancement of a world where there is mutual understanding and mutually beneficial relationships.

Keywords China • hegemony • inner-self • Jamaica

“The greatest journey of our age shall be
that which takes us inwards”

INTRODUCTION

The future is immediate, springing ever new from the present and the past. Therefore the future is this moment, not some abstract time many years, weeks or days hence. There is no ‘future’ in which we may become good, conscientious, compassionate, intelligent human beings, if that is not what we are today. Those who promote the idea that the future will be better for all human beings, based simply on the fact that in this is the imagining of a state we have not yet experienced, are abdicating their responsibility to the present time, and perpetuating the blossoming of illusion. Politicians and priests are quite adept at this.

To approach the subject of global hegemony and its remaking is to undertake a mammoth task, multi-layered and complex. As I do not presume to be versed in international relations, diplomacy or law, perhaps I should like to look at this subject we are addressing from the broad perspective of man and time, or man in relation to time.

One can only remake something that existed before. This remaking presumes destruction, damage or rethought. An important question concerning that to be refashioned has to do

with ingredients. Are we to remake with the same old ingredients, or parts; or shall everything be made new, whole? Another important question concerns time – all aspects of time, including inward and outward time as it relates to man, chronological time by which society is ordered, and through which we think we make sense of the world.

That which is global, no doubt, concerns the entire world, is rooted in commonality. This brings me to the question of man in his universal interconnectedness known simply as *humanity*. For despite the devices we have invented to tear ourselves one from the other – nationality, race, ethnicity, class, creed, religion and language – it is indisputable that we all belong, collectively, to a single humanity. This is not an abstract idea, but an actuality.

The problem has always been with hegemony, has it not? For this implies leadership at one level, surrendering of authority to someone else at another, and that total dominance of one group over another, at a third. Here we encounter conflict in the relation of the human being to himself as well as to the other. For this hegemony manifests in thought, religion, politics, race, economics and the like.

THE CARIBBEAN, JAMAICA AND CHINA

Jamaica, China and the Caribbean are all part of that global space, ostensibly describing countries and a region with clearly defined borders. We know the all too familiar history of Jamaica – this land of wood and water, characterized in recorded history by decimation, repopulation, slavery, an ill-defined struggle for selfhood and independence. And of China – her claim to thousands of years of culture and civilization, the blossoming of which happened during the dynasty of the Great Tang from 618 to 907, some one and a half millennia ago. It was during this time that she assumed feudal dominance in the ancient world, when scholars from all walks of life flocked to her great halls of learning at Chang'an (长安), and stayed as though they would never leave, studying a culture to be emulated or replicated elsewhere. Japan, Korea and Vietnam are living examples of such learning. This same China, with differing degrees of modification, is once again striving upwards.

The Caribbean describes that archipelago, scattered somewhere beneath the sun, between two or more seas. Jamaica, China and the Caribbean are lumped together with other nation states

into the developing world. We assume that the trajectory of this development must be towards a state that can be described as 'developed', which in itself is an extreme, a polarity attracting its very antithesis, decay.

These definitions concern man in relation to himself, to other human beings and to the natural world, of which he is a part. They also concern history. For knowledge is the product of history, as is thought. Man is his knowledge and the absolute outcome of history, rooted in subconscious and chronological time.

I have not come to this paper armed with facts, figures and statistics. For I am not seeking to present ideas grounded in the past. In fact, I am attempting to question our journey as a race and our relationship to time. In this, therefore, I am not too concerned with that incestuous relationship we have to history and scholarship, quoting from each other to prove some point or fact, or to simply demonstrate knowledge. It is this very knowledge, which is the product of our past that I probe.

The outer world upon which I gaze in the present day is a reflection of man's inner-world. If this outer world is so defined by greed, hatred, bigotry, nationalism, intolerance and the like, then what teems in that inner world? Is it at all possible to address the outer world without, first of all, paying studied attention to that inner-world of man?

The first two sentences in the document entitled "China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean" states "*The world today is undergoing major transformation and adjustment. Peace and development are the trend of the times.*" I do not know whether the author of those words lives in the same world that I do, but certainly peace is not a trend of these times. We have never been more at war – economic, military, ideological, political, geographical and legal. In fact I would say that inner and outer conflict characterize the present time. It is quite clear to me that while we speak about peace and development we are busy preparing for war – arming ourselves, our nation states, devising methods of killing each other with utmost efficiency, and generally preparing for utter and complete decimation of the human family and the natural environment.

Whither development? Yes, we are moving by increments, if not in fits and starts, making scientific and technological discoveries and advances. Some of these same advances concern our newly mastered expertise at destruction. But for all the gorgeous architecture, glass, steel and concrete, adorning sprawling

capitals, have we developed inwardly? Are we matching an inner development with these outer, visible, movements?

CHINA – A RISING HEGEMONIC SUPERPOWER?

It has become quite evident that within recent times Asia, in general, and China, in particular have become the centre of focus in world affairs, gaining wealth, political clout, popularity, and extending this power abroad. This has been labelled in many ways: “*China’s peaceful rise*”, “*creation of a harmonious society/world*” and seems to embrace the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) by which the Middle Way is sought in all action.

Does China’s peaceful rise depend solely on China? Can peace depend on a single country, ideology or system of government? Is it possible to prevent others from nurturing envy towards us? What do we mean when we speak about a harmonious world or society – in harmony with what and with whom? What are the seeds of harmony, and how do we go about sowing and nurturing those seeds?

The issue I address is quite complex. From the outset there is division. We are born into a divided, broken-up world. In this state there must be conflict – between the leader to the led, the rich and the poor, small nations and large nations, between one religion or ideology and another, one race and another, and so on. But aren’t these divisions the result of our history, of time, education, of the perpetuation of hurt and illusion? And after centuries of conflict and war and history, can time solve these same problems? Is it the fate of humanity to be beset by conflict, misery and war?

At an international forum in Beijing, in 2010, I posed this question to a leading Chinese economist and intellectual: “*China is trying to lift 1.3 billion people out of poverty. Can this be achieved not at the expense of other nations?*” About twenty minutes ensued wherein my question was skirted around, but, in the end, given no definitive answer. Even so, credit must be given to China, not only in the present time, but historically. For she has never been that kind of country seeking to extend her power in a colonizing manner. Today, agreements into which she enters are mutual and to the best of my knowledge, legal, including those with Jamaica.

I understood at the time, as I understand now, that there was no simple way in which to respond to my question. For how would we measure detriment, with whose scales, and who would judge?

Two thousand five hundred years ago during the 《春秋》

Spring and Autumn Period of Chinese civilization, Lao Zi wrote in his famous 《道德經》 (*The Book of the Way and its Power*):

He who assists the ruler
by means of the Dao
Does not conquer countries
by military force.

Military actions usually invite
retaliatory aftermath:
Wherever armies station,
Thistles and thorns grow;
A great war is always followed
By a great famine.

He who is well versed in the art of war
Only uses the force to win the war,
And not to bully or conquer
other countries.

Win the war but do not boast;
Win the war but do not brag;
Win the war but do not show arrogance;
Win the war but do know
it is out of necessity;
Win the war but do not thereby
bully and conquer other countries.

Whatever is in its prime is bound to decline;
For, being in prime is against the Dao;
Whatever goes against the Dao
Will come to an early end.

– Dao De Jing, Chapter 30

Over the course of 2,500 years, successive Chinese leaders seemed to have heeded the words of this great teacher, even though it is probably true that those ‘other countries’ referred to by Lao Zi were actually on the same mass of land that, in geographical terms, we have come to know today as China.

China seems to understand very well that should she raise the sword against another, the sword will also be raised against her. And, therefore, to accomplish her aims, she raises the dollar bill, establishing institutions of learning like the one I lead at this university.

A WORLD WITHOUT HEGEMONY

An integral question that I have is whether there needs to be hegemony in the world. Is this dominance of one group over another natural, forced, necessary? Can the world be ordered in such a way that there is no dominance, or desire to dominate? Is it possible to exist without authority – be that inward or outward authority? There is the authority of the parent over the child, who says, “*Listen to what I tell you*”, “*Do as I say*”; of the teacher over the pupil, the politician over the supporter of ballots, and the list goes on. In these relationships is there freedom? In the relationship of one state dominating another, saying, “*You must follow my rules, or else...*” is there freedom?

Certainly we need authority in the world. Parents must exercise some kind of authority over their children, teachers over their pupils. We all understand that. But this is not exactly the authority of which I speak. Do we surrender our inner authority to someone, to some ideology or the state?

I spoke earlier about division and being born in a fractured world. Let me address this issue for a while. From the day of birth one ‘belongs’ to a group, defined by country, ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, political affiliations, etc. These eventual labels do not bind us to the rest of humanity. From early we are taught to be individuals, and to live in perpetual fear of the other. Yet the root meaning of that word ‘individual’ is not properly understood. Individual really means that which cannot be divided. We acquire knowledge that is not always questioned, and generally we accept the way things are, exactly as we found them. So, if you were born in the so-called First World, it would perhaps come to you, naturally, that the position you occupy among humankind is a superior one. Or if you were born in a place where the members of your ethnicity, your religious movement, etc. are dominant, others merely become ‘minorities’. Similarly, if you happened to have been born into tremendous wealth, or royalty, the people who do not occupy your class or echelon are simply lower than yourself. These are accepted without question. This then defines your relationship – to yourself and others, including those who do not belong to your own country. I see this as the accepted norm in the world today, based purely on accident of context. This state defies the cultivation of real, creative intelligence.

Naturally, language follows and mirrors patterns of thought. When we speak, for example, of ethnic minorities, what is

sometimes implied is that these are 'minor people', perhaps not quite human. When we scoff at religious minorities, we are affirming our superior position. And when large, wealthy countries refer to their enemies, it is not uncommon for whole nations of people to be lumped together as 'the enemy'. They are then bombed, poisoned, annihilated. For, after all, they are not like us, so we ought to wipe them from the face of the Earth. It is clear to see that these illusory divisions create real fear and havoc in the world. Sometimes entire foreign policies are rooted in mistrust and trepidation. Dominance, therefore, of one individual over the next, of one state over another, creates fear. Do we not find that mankind today lives in utter dread? From individuals to nation states, we seem to be saturated with fears, insecurities. Isn't this the reason that in some countries ordinary civilians may be heavily armed? Isn't this the very reason why the trade in arms is booming like never before? Where fear or its allies abide, then love is extinguished. For fear and love do not thrive together. In the absence of love there is no true freedom, no true growth, no wisdom to which we may aspire or from which we may take counsel.

Ought we to question these things? Are we satisfied living in the manner we do, accepting the dominance of others, while dominating another in return? Are we satisfied promoting the illusion of that 'individuality' which can be cut off from other human beings – an isolationist position? Do we ever question these things? Are we sure that the manner in which we now live is creative, intelligent?

HEGEMONY vs. THE INNER-SELF

It is my view that the greatest journey of our age shall be that which takes us inwards. For this inward probe, the cultivation and attention to an inner life, the insight that as individuals we are bound together in common humanity, the nurturing of self-knowledge and creative intelligence shall be our seeds of redemption. This will demand great courage, patience and the cultivation of a deep understanding of self, and through this an understanding of others. For self-knowledge must and shall be that pivotal axis from which we operate and through which the inner and outer worlds are perceived, arrested and reconciled. This understanding of others leads to tolerance, an acceptance of difference – real or imagined.

In turn, this may lead to the nurturing of compassion and deep, abiding care, not just for other humans but all life.

Regardless of where we abide, constant attention to this inward journey may dissolve those imaginary boundaries of our so-called individuality and reveal to us the actuality of the non-existence of the self. Now, this may be a concept not easily grasped. We are always so very sure of who we are – our height, sex, weight, skin colour, likes, dislikes, age and status. We claim these things as integral parts of the ‘self’. These very things, including our knowledge, our education isolate us from each other. We have all created an image of ourselves, which oftentimes has nothing to do with who we really are.

Can you kill the self? Can you crush this ego? Can you gaze upon another human being with an understanding so rooted in compassion, empathy and intelligence that those borders separating you dissolve into nothingness, leading to insight that you are both one, in the same way that you, the clouds, trees and universe are one?

I therefore advocate the lessening of knowledge. No, not abolishing of schools and formal education – far from it. I speak rather of the addiction to knowledge, to that which is calcified and dead, to that which does not lead us to true freedom, but binds us to perpetual conflict and failure.

I am advocating a course of action that demands bravery, the cultivation of intelligence, without any system. For the existence of systems has been our great downfall, in this march towards eventual civilization. This has to come from true insight, however, which demands a profound change in consciousness.

Instead of a hegemonic construct, one state to another, one individual to the next, may we not cultivate mutual understanding, mutually beneficial relationships? It seems to me that this could be the trajectory on which we engage each other, nation and nation, state to state. We may understand each other despite language and other differences, without having to be homogenized, westernized or Americanized. For even if we accept a shift in global hegemony, the ingredients that compose this movement will still result in hegemony. In advocating for true freedom, the relationship of one to another must be defined by that freedom. Otherwise there shall be no freedom for he who dominates or the one who is dominated.

CONCLUSION: JAMAICA, HEGEMONY AND THE INNER-SELF

I wish to conclude on the question of Jamaica. A young journalist recently asked whether, in my view, anyone could help us – ‘us’ meaning Jamaica. Of course the answer to this question was, and still is, an unequivocal ‘no’. The Jamaican journey must lead inwards. It is the absence of this inner-life, drowned out by the cacophony in which we exist, that most holds us back. Without this inner-life, there will not be creative intelligence, or any approach to insight, or freedom. In this, there is no one who may help us. For it must be a singular action, undertaken by each individual. Perhaps we may start in the murky waters of doubt that flow in the river of psychological time. In every facet of life on this island, there will have to be probing, questioning – of an inner and outer nature. For probing, questioning, doubt constitute the very foundation upon which reason and intelligence flourish. And where reason, compassion and intelligence do not flourish the guns may be aimed at us, we may sell for money that which money cannot buy, dogma and superstition may be used to cower and silence us into that dark night of fear and dread.

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EUROPE and *the* Middle East

Hegemony and Postcolonial Entanglements

JOHANNES MAERK

Abstract • The different cultural and economic hegemonic actors in the Arab World over the centuries have influenced contemporary international relations particularly between Europe and the Middle East. This paper examines this historical relationship by exploring the Muslim hegemony in Southern Europe (from 622-1491), the colonization of the Muslim World, and the emergence of a post-colonial hegemonic project through the Barcelona Process in 1995. The paper also highlights the present role of the Ideaz Institute to disrupt the implicit hegemonic tendencies of the Barcelona Process, through its culturally sensitive engagement in the Arab World.

Keywords Middle East • Europe • imperialism • Muslim world

The expression "Middle East" is an old British label based on a British Western perception of the East divided into middle or near and far, which are two relative concepts having Britain as a reference point. The expression is a projection from outside, not emerging from inside, conceiving the other in relation to the self as it was always the case in classical orientalism, the periphery in relation to the center, which is already a power relationship (Hanafi, 1998:1).

INTRODUCTION

Historically the relationship between Europe and the Middle East has been characterized by particularly fractious periods. This paper will primarily focus on three moments of this often troubled relationship between Europe and Middle East:

- (i) the Muslim hegemony (also called Al-Andulus) in Southern Europe that lasted from 622 to the year 1492 (when the Kings of Spain regained their territory and expanded it to the Americas);¹
- (ii) the colonization of the Muslim World in the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth centuries by the British and French Empire (and to lesser extent by Italy); and

(iii) the starting of a postcolonial hegemonic project through the so-called Barcelona process in 1995 after the Arab countries gained their independence during the 1920s through to 1960s.

Finally, I discuss some aspects of the engagement of the Ideaz Institute in the Arab World.

AL-ANDALUS (711–1492): HEGEMONY FROM THE SOUTH

Al-Andalus² represents the period of Muslim dominance in Europe, when the Muslim community covered the geographical area of the Iberian Peninsula and some Mediterranean islands like Crete, Sicily, and the Balearics. In 711, the Arabic army leader Musa ibn Tariq, who had previously conquered Egypt from North Africa and the local Berber peoples, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar with his troops and penetrated the kingdom of the Visigoths. Al-Andalus became the object of romantic glorification. Until today, especially in the Arab world the myth of a Moorish Spain prevails, where a quite peaceful multiculturalism existed. The city of Córdoba (nowadays in Spain) became a leading cultural and economic centre of both the Mediterranean and the Islamic world. It was by far the largest city in Europe in the 10th century. This myth is the opposite of the intolerant and aggressive Catholic Church whose gloomy work culminated in the establishment of the Inquisition to suppress the remaining Muslims.

A striking example of the Arab cultural and economic hegemony is reflected on a map by the Muslim geographer and cartographer Al-Idrisi (1099–1165), who created a world map in 1154 called *Tabula Rogeriana* (Eng. “The Map of Roger”).³ Al-Idrisi worked for 18 years at the court of the Norman King Roger II of Sicily on the illustrations and comments of the map. It shows the entire Eurasian continent and the north of Africa. It is described in Arabic and unlike today’s maps in south-north direction, Europe is in the lower right side of the map; the Arab world on the top.



Figure 1: Al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtaq fī ikhtirāq al-âfâq* (Journey of one who is eager to traverse horizons⁴)

FROM EARLY EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM TO THE (SEMI-) HEGEMONY OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS

A second decisive moment in Arab-European relationship is the presence of European imperialism in the Middle East during the 19th century. The term ‘Middle East’ emerges in the British Empire (and subsequently in other European countries) to contrast this region from its far east.⁵ Authors from the region share the view of Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafī, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Cairo University. Hanafī suggests that:

The so-called Middle East has its own label from within, not from without, perceived by its own peoples and cultures. It is called the Arab World, a geographic label which is not a sufficient one for an Arab nationalist preferring the Arab Nation. It is called also the Islamic or Muslim World, a larger circle which is more satisfactory for a pan-Islamist. Some modernists, such as Malik ben Nabi from Algeria would equate it with the Afro-Asian World even if it includes some non-Muslims but they share the same ideals of independence and development with the whole. The identity of this world is not essentially religious but socio-political (Hanafi 1998:1)

The center-periphery situation in southern Mediterranean nowadays is very similar to the Caribbean. In both geographical areas we can find an “imperial frontier/frontera imperial”. According to Juan Bosch (1970:70):

The Caribbean was conquered and turned into a scene of armed conflicts between empires – and therefore became an imperial border – because the history of Europe was in her womb imperialistic, and imperialism was a historical trend. Therefore the Caribbean countries should not be seen as isolated entities. All came into the same Western history due to the same cause, and all have been dragged along the centuries by the one and only force.

Likewise, the Arab world was divided into several different spaces in accordance with the dominance of the various colonial powers: Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy (see Figure 2). This implies that the traditional ties remain strong with the former colonizers.




Figure 2: European controlled territories in the 20th century Middle East.⁶

After the dominant period of European imperialism and the subsequent decolonization process between the 1920s and the 1960s, Europe started a new initiative in the 1990s along the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, summarized by the Italian

scholar Stefano Costalli (2009:324) as “a ‘half-way hegemon’ trying to enforce a ‘half-way hegemonic strategy’”.

The new initiative is called the “Barcelona Process”⁷ – now a buzzword of the EU-Mediterranean relationship. This process started with the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona on November 27-28, 1995 as a dialogue among people in the Mediterranean regions. In a final declaration three areas of cooperation⁸ were identified:

- ***Political and Security Dialogue*** – aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights.
- ***Economic and Financial Partnership*** – including the gradual establishment of a free-trade area aimed at promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socioeconomic development.
- ***Social, Cultural and Human Partnership*** – aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural dialogue between cultures, religions and peoples, and facilitating exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people.⁹

While areas 1 and 2 of the Barcelona declaration deal explicitly with economic, security, and political affairs, the third area addresses issues of social and cultural affairs. In this third area we can find processes through which international organizations develop their institutions of hegemony and its ideology. According to Robert Cox (1993:50):

Among the features of international organisation which express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb counter hegemonic ideas.

In the case of the Barcelona process such an international organization was created in spring 2005 – the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures (shortly afterwards re-named Anna Lindh¹⁰ Foundation) that was launched at its headquarters in Alexandria, Egypt. The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) has sponsored various academic, cultural, and artistic projects linking Euro-Mediterranean NGOs and has held a number

of conferences and meetings on the intercultural and civilizational dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

One of the most critical points of this Initiative (as in the case of the Helsinki process¹¹) is the agenda setting and implementation to induce socioeconomic and political change from the North (European Union) in the southern Mediterranean.¹² Additionally the dialogue was also criticized from the Arab side as being:

a platform for the EU to promote its values rather than to find common ground. Using its control of the finances of the Dialogue, the EU is in a strong position to promote the notion that the EU core values should be viewed as the common values which the Dialogue aspires to promote in Arab countries (Selim, 2009:53).

ENGAGEMENT OF IDEAZ IN THE ARAB WORLD WITHIN THE NETWORK OF THE ANNA LINDH FOUNDATION

Beginning in 2009, the Ideaz Institute (Vienna) started to work with the Civitas Institute¹⁵ in Gaza, Palestine on applied research projects. Since both institutes are members of their respective national Anna Lindh Foundation networks, most of the projects so far were funded by the aforementioned foundation. The first joint initiative was the project “Brothers in Arms:¹⁴ overcoming the impact of violence in civil war in Gaza and Austria” (2009-2010), which was undertaken in both entities and funded by the ALF. The aim of the project was to support civil society initiatives in Gaza to mitigate the inter-Palestinian conflict between the (secular) Fatah and the (religious) Hamas movements. The Civitas Institute carried out this task by organizing workshops for both political factions, displaying posters in the streets of Gaza and airing radio spots nationwide. Another element to support this reconciliation process was the creation of artistic cartoons, which were displayed in public spaces: Figure 3, one of more than 20 such cartoons, features a Palestinian businessman who has the choice between the ending of root (as-sal) as “am” (Peace) or “eh” (Arms). The role of the Austrian partner was to explain the mechanisms of reconciliation that evolved from the Austrian civil war in 1932 when socialist-secular political movements were clashing violently with Catholic-Christian followers. In a conference in Gaza in May 2010 the findings of the project were presented to the public and a declaration was adopted.



Figure 3: As-Salam (Peace) or As-Saleh (Arms)?

An important feature of the collaboration between Civitas and Ideaz is to reduce the implicit hegemonic tendencies of the Barcelona Process as described above. In all projects, Civitas Institute was the project leader and there is a common understanding that a Eurocentric outlook only perpetuates the type of academic collaboration between the Arab world and Europe that encourages Western hegemony. As a further step in overcoming these “cherished assumptions and axiomatic principles of Western philosophy as objective reason, humanism, the idea of progress, culture-transcending knowledge, and the radical dualism between religion and science” (Boroujerdi, 2004:30), the idea of Civitas Academy as a School for Democracy and Leadership¹⁵ was conceived. This academy aims to promote a counter-hegemonic outlook in order to train community leaders in the Arab World for social change. In a second phase Civitas Academy will try to reach out to other “Southern spaces” with similar problems and challenges: Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and most of Asia. As Ian Boxill rightly points out, academics and scholar-activists in the “Southern spaces” have to “interrogate the theories, meta-theories, methodologies and meta-methodologies which are imported from the industrialised countries, instead of passively accepting them as relevant to local reality” (Boxill, 1998:71). In order to support these ideas Civitas Academy will promote academic interchanges and applied research projects for community leaders involving a South-South dimension.¹⁶

CONCLUSION

From the arguments presented in this paper, some amount of light is shed on the pendulum of hegemonic influence between the Middle East and Europe. Since the hegemonic momentum currently lies on the European side, it seems necessary to promote collaboration that begins to act “as sources of scepticism toward the victorious systems of knowledge, and as the means of recovering and transmitting knowledge that has been cornered, marginalized and even defeated” (Nandy, 2000:118).

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Notes

1. There was also a period between the end of Al-Andalus and the beginning of European imperialism in the 19th century that was characterized by the Christian Crusades from the eleventh century onwards to the defeat of the Muslim Ottoman Empire in 1683 during the siege of Vienna (see details in Shadid & Koningsveld, 2000).
2. The etymology of “Al-Andalus” is disputed (see, for example, Bossong, 2002).
3. More information about the map and the map itself can be found in Edrisi (1866).
4. Also known as *Book of Roger*. Sicily, 1154, Oxford, The Bodleian Library (internet source: http://classes.bnf.fr/idrisi/grand/9_05.htm).
5. Culcasi (2012) presents a detailed analysis of the Arab perspective regarding the actual toponym of the Middle East. See also the motto at the beginning of this article.
6. Source: Centre for Research on Globalization, Montreal, Canada. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/economic-development-performance-east-asia-versus-the-arab-world/27239>
7. This process is also sometimes labelled as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and links the 27 EU member states and 16 Mediterranean partners: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
8. These areas of cooperation are also called “baskets”.

9. This information was obtained directly from the official EU Diplomacy Service, the European External Action Service on their website: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm. In 2004 a fourth basket, migration, was added.
10. Ann Lindh (1957-2003) was the assassinated Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
11. For details regarding the Helsinki Process see Spencer (1991).
12. A review of the Barcelona process from the Arab perspective can be found in Selim (2009).
13. The goals of the Civitas Institute are:
 - Expanding and deepening democratic practices, principles, and behaviours among Palestinians
 - Achieving social change through leadership development among new generations
 - Building capacities of Palestinian institutions and strengthening the relations between different sectors of the Palestinian society
 - Achieving consensus among Palestinians through providing civic forums and platforms for community and grassroot leaders
 - Enhancing transparency among Palestinian communities and institutions. (Information retrieved from: <http://humanrights.ps/user/52>). More information about the Civitas Institute can be found on Facebook.
14. “Brothers in Arms” is a reference to a song with the same title of the British rock band Dire Straits. The song was written during the Falklands War in 1982.
15. The Civitas Academy is a programme designed and managed by the Civitas Institute in partnership initially with Religious Social Democrats /Sweden, Maat Foundation for Peace, Development, and Human Rights/ Egypt, Ideaz Institute/Austria, Association of Civil Society/Turkey, Yemen Center for Human Rights/Yemen, Liberties Group for Human Rights/Libya, and Arab World Center for Democracy and Election Monitoring/West Bank, Palestine.
16. More suggestions regarding the strengthening of South-South collaboration can be found in Maerk (2012).

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REGIONAL International Courts in South and Central America and the Caribbean Region

Analysing the Dynamics between the Hegemony of Supranational/Regional Organizations and the Sovereignty of National Governments

UFOT B. INAMETE

Abstract • The focus of this paper is on the regional international courts in South and Central America and the Caribbean Region. These regional international courts are the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the Central American Court of Justice, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Caribbean Court of Justice. This study is essentially an analysis and a comparison of these courts. The structure, functioning, and outputs of these four courts are closely examined. Since each of these courts is an arm of the regional integration organization in each of their respective regions, this study also examines how each of these courts reflects on the level of political and economic integration in each of their respective regional integration organization.

Keywords regional international courts • court structure • court administration

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this study is the examination of how regional courts have helped to change the configuration of power in the global system, through the shifting of some powers from national governments to supranational/regional organizations. These dynamics are occurring in many continents and regions of the world. The dynamics of shifting of some powers from national governments to supranational/regional organizations logically often mean tensions between the forces and groups that advocate and promote the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations and the forces and groups that fight against

the erosions of sovereignty of national governments. Those who advocate and promote the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations often point to increased economic growth, and increased international power in the global system the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations fosters. On the other hand, forces and groups that fight against the erosions of sovereignty of national governments are often afraid of national governments losing the power to determine economic policies, labour/employment policies, language policies, and to generally promote the national interests of countries. The tensions between the forces and groups that advocate and promote the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations and the forces and groups that fight against the erosions of sovereignty of national governments represent the centripetal forces and the centrifugal, respectively, in various regions of the world. In various regions of the world, in various periods or eras, each of these two forces/groups are able to more or less determine the reality in their respective region. Therefore, in one period or era forces and groups that advocate and promote the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations may be more powerful, while at another period or era the forces and groups that fight against the erosions of sovereignty of national governments may be more powerful.

The sort of powers that each regional international court has often shown in a more distilled and crystallized form where the pendulum is placed in a continuum, where the forces and groups that advocate and promote the hegemony of supranational/regional organizations, and the forces and groups that fight against the erosions of sovereignty of national governments, are at the extreme opposite ends. This sort of reality is due to the fact that regional international courts clearly state and pronounce the powers that have shifted to the supranational/regional organizations in a very distilled and crystallized form (in the form of the legal framework of a supranational/regional organization). Therefore, this study of the four regional international courts will also help to gauge the degree power has shifted from national governments to the supranational/regional organization in their respective regions.

Specifically, this is a study of regional international courts in South and Central America and the Caribbean region. Essentially, the specific goal of this study is the analysis and comparison of these international regional courts, in order to understand their impacts and how they are different from each other. These regional international courts are analysed and compared, in terms of their

structures, functioning, and impacts. Additionally, due to the fact that these courts are organs or arms of the regional integration organization in each of their respective regions, this study also analyses how each of these regional international courts mirrors the level of political, economic, and socio-cultural integration in each of their respective regional integration organizations.

The regional international courts that are the subjects of this study are the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the Central American Court of Justice, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Caribbean Court of Justice. As much as feasible and reasonable, each of these four courts are analysed in terms of the history of their creation, the factors that led to their creation, their respective locations, the nature of their position and profile (as an organ or arm of the respective regional integration organization to which they belong), the member countries of the respective regional integration organization to which they belong, their goals, their structures, their functions, their jurisdictions and powers, the profile of their judges, their judgments and other outputs, their advisory opinions, their constraints, and their achievements.

For analytic ease and convenience, this study is divided into seven sections. The first of these is this introductory section. The other six sections are: the Court of Justice of the Andean Community; the Central American Court of Justice; the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court; the Caribbean Court of Justice; a comparative analysis; and conclusions.

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY

The Court of Justice of the Andean Community (Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina) (White, 2009) is a regional international court in South America. The Court of Justice of the Andean Community is a body or an institution of the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina) (Comunidad Andina, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). “The Court was created in 1979 as the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, which established the Andean Community in May, 1969” (White, 2009). Furthermore, “The Trujillo Act of March 1996 modified it into the Court of Justice of the Andean Community,” and, additionally, “The Cochabamba Protocol, known as the Protocol of Modification of the Treaty Establishing the Court of Justice of the Andean Community and signed on May 28, 1996, modified the statute of the Court” (White,

2009). On the whole, “the Court, as it is today, officially came into force in August 1999” (White, 2009).

It is important to note that the Trujillo Act and the Cochabamba Protocol were very vital to the Court. After it was created “in 1979, the Court was relatively inactive” (White, 2009). Very significantly, “the Trujillo Act and the Cochabamba Protocol put new life into the Court and it has been extensively used ever since” (White, 2009). The Court has its permanent headquarters in Quito, the capital of the Republic of Ecuador (Comunidad Andina, 2010a, 2011d; White, 2009).

The Court is the judicial body or organ of the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, 2010a, 2010b; White, 2009). The Andean Community is a regional integration body which, as its name connotes, consists of countries in the Andean region of South America. The member countries of the Andean Community are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (Comunidad Andina, 2011a; White, 2009), and as a regional integration body, all its institutions and bodies (including the Court) work towards deepening and expanding economic, political, and socio-cultural integrations among all the member countries (Comunidad Andina, 2011a; Riesenfeld, 1974:436-438; White, 2009).

The goals, functions, powers, and the jurisdictions of the Court are “(1) to ensure respect for Andean Community law and the legality of Community provisions; (2) to settle disputes that arise from Community law; and (3) to interpret Community law in order to ensure uniform application” (White, 2009). Specifically the Court has the power to nullify the decisions and actions of the policy making bodies of the Andean Community (the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, the Andean Community Commission, and the Secretariat), if those decisions and actions are in conflict with the Andean Community law; has the power to rule on the compliance and non-compliance of member countries in terms of the Andean Community law; has the power to issue binding interpretations of the Andean Community law when requested by national judges of member countries; has the power to demand the policy making bodies of the Andean Community (the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, the Andean Community Commission, and the Secretariat) to fulfill the obligations required of them by the Andean Community law, when the policy making bodies fail to carry out their obligations, through their acts of omission or inactivity; has the power to settle or arbitrate disputes among bodies, organs, and institutions of the Andean Community; and has the power

to hear labour disputes that may arise among the bodies, organs, and institutions of the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, 2010b; White, 2009).

Very significantly, “Article 41 of the Court’s Treaty” states that “in order to be carried out, the Court’s rulings and arbitration awards and the arbitration awards of the General Secretariat shall not require official approval or exequatur in any Member Country” (White, 2009). Therefore, “the decisions of the Court are self-executing and directly applicable under the national law of member states without further implementation” (White, 2009). Thus, on the whole the Court has significant and important powers.

In terms of its structure, the court consists of four judges (Comunidad Andina, 2011e; White, 2009). Each of these four judges represents each of the four member countries of the Andean Community; serves a six-year term (and is only eligible for one re-election); works without coming under the influence of their respective national governments; gets their appointment through the unanimous consent of the plenipotentiary representatives from the member countries; is a jurist of the highest standing; is an individual of high moral character; and enjoys diplomatic immunities (Comunidad Andina, 2010b; White 2009). The administration of the Court has a Court Secretary and other administrative staff of the Court; and all administrative officers of the Court also have diplomatic immunities (Comunidad Andina, 2010b). Expectedly, these administrative officials handle the administrative affairs of the Court, and therefore free the judges from the routine and mundane administrative duties of the Court. The administrative officers therefore enable the judges to devote more of their time to purely judicial functions of the Court. This sort of dynamic logically enhances the efficiency of the Court.

One of the judges of the Court serves as its President (Comunidad Andina, 2011c). In 2011 the judges of the court were Dr. Leonor Perdomo Perdomo, Dr. Carlos Jaime Villarroel Ferrer, Dr. Ricardo Vigil Toledo (served as the President of the Court), and Dr. Jose Vicente Troya Jaramillo (Comunidad Andina, 2011e). In 2010, the President of the Court was Dr. Leonor Perdomo Perdomo (Comunidad Andina, 2010a), while in 2011 the President of the Court was Dr. Ricardo Vigil Toledo (Comunidad Andina, 2011e).

The court is a very productive and active court. In 2011 it was noted that the Court had “over 1000 rulings – more than 85% of which involve intellectual property rights (IP) disputes” (quoted from unnamed source in White, 2009). Helfer et al. (2009) have

also noted that the Court is a regional international court that has made excellent contributions in terms of the Court's rulings on intellectual property law. On the whole, the Court is perceived as a very significant and productive regional international court. Concisely, White (2009) states that "the Court of Justice of the Andean Community is a highly active international court".

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COURT OF JUSTICE

As its name connotes, the Central American Court of Justice is a regional international court in Central America. Historically, it has been noted that there are actually two Central American Courts of Justice: an older one and a newer one. The existence of an older version and a newer version of this Court is a reflection of long historical and frequent efforts to create regional integration organizations among the countries of Central America (Jordison, 2009:184). The older version of the Court was created in 1908 and is also sometimes called the Court of Cartago; and the newer version of the Court was created in 1995 and is also sometimes called the Court of Managua (Jordison, 2009:184).

In terms of the newer or current Court, "The Statute of the Central American Court of Justice was signed in the XIII Summit of Central American Presidents in compliance with Article 12 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa" (Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana-SICA [Central American Integration System], 2010). Therefore, "through the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, the Central American Court of Justice (the 'Court') came into existence, thus fulfilling an ideal of the Central American states"; and "the Court is also known as the Corte de Managua, or the Court of Managua" (Jordison, 2009:218).

The Central American Court of Justice "is part of the bodies of the Central American Integration System" (Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana-SICA [Central American Integration System], 2010). The Central American Integration System, as its name connotes, is an organization that fosters economic, political, and socio-cultural integration in Central America; and its member countries are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; with the Dominican Republic being an associated country in the organization (Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana-SICA [Central American Integration System], 2011).

In terms of the structure of the Court and the profile of the judges of the Court, each member selects "two principal

magistrates, or justices, and two individuals that will serve as their deputies” (Jordison, 2009:222). The magistrates and the deputies “serve for a period of ten years”, and those who serve in these positions “must meet the requirements established for the highest judicial position in their electing country” (Jordison, 2009:222). Also, “the presidency and vice presidency of the Court is rotated among its members every year; the order of selection is determined alphabetically”, and “the persons serving in these positions must be of different nationalities, an important innovation” (Jordison, 2009:222). As a permanent court, the magistrates of the Court have to permanently reside in Managua, in the Republic of Nicaragua (Jordison, 2009:222), which is where the Court is located. The supreme court in each of the member countries nominate those who have the potential to serve as magistrates of the Court (Jordison, 2009:222). However, those who are appointed to the Court are expected to be independent and impartial, and therefore the magistrates of Court are perceived “as supranational and international beings that owe a duty of loyalty to the Central American Court of Justice” (Jordison, 2009:223). The magistrates are paid salaries from funds that are adequately insulated from direct influence of member countries (Jordison, 2009:223). Also, being “a magistrate for the Court is prestigious in the international arena and among one’s peers locally, regionally, and internationally” (Jordison, 2009:223); additionally, they enjoy diplomatic immunities (Jordison, 2009: 223). Therefore, on the whole, the sources of salaries, the prestige, and the diplomatic profile combine to help to promote the independence of the magistrates.

The Court is viewed as being the “depository and keeper of the values that constitute the Central American nationality” (the Central American Court Convention quoted in Jordison, 2009:220). In terms of the functions of the Court, the Court is to guarantee the respect of the laws that relate to the regional integration organization in Central America (Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana-SICA [Central American Integration System], 2010). Additionally, “the Court may rule on matters that deal with grievances that involve any branch or office of government when the wrongful act is a consequence of disregarding a local court’s order”; the Court may “rule on any issue that may arise between a Member State and any other state if the non-Member State agrees to the Court’s jurisdiction”; the Court may serve “as an appellate body when reviewing any regulations or declarations” made by

the Central American Integration System; the Court serves as “a consultative body for the supreme court of each Member State, as well as for any branch of government when a matter of treaty interpretation is involved”; the Court can “decide on matters regarding actions” by the Central American Integration System “that may affect anyone”; and the Court can “determine its own jurisdiction when some specific types of cases are brought before it” (Jordison, 2009:220-221).

It has also been noted that the “Decisions of the Court are final and cannot be repealed”; “there is no ability to obtain the revision of a decision”; and “the only recourse available is to invite the Court” to enable clearing up obscure or ambiguous reasoning or handle something that was not initially resolved in the suit (Jordison, 2009:222). It is also important to note that “the Court has jurisdiction over internal national matters and can decide issues involving a state’s sovereignty” (Jordison, 2009:222).

The Court has handled a significant amount of cases. For an example, from 1994 to 2004 it handled and decided forty-seven cases; and it also issued twenty-one advisory opinions that were requested by agencies in Central America (Jordison, 2009:223). However, it is also important to add that “the Court has functioned effectively without the support of all its Member States or their publics” (Jordison, 2009:243).

On the whole, the Court has done well. “The joining of Guatemala, as well as the possible acceptance of adhesion by Panama and the Dominican Republic” were seen as giving “the Court regional scope and identity” (Jordison, 2009:184). Through the cases it has decided, and through “the extra-judicial activities that it hosts, encourages, and in which it participates” the Court has emerged as “an institution of international and supranational character” (Jordison, 2009:184).

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court serves countries and territories in the Eastern Caribbean region. The countries are former colonies of Britain, and the territories are British Overseas Territories.

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court was created in 1967 through the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order No. 223 of 1967 (*The Anguillian*, 2007; Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, 2010; *The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010). The

Court, which was initially called the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court, assumed its current name in 1982 due to the fact that many of the countries in the Eastern Caribbean became independent (*The Anguillan*, 2007). Anguilla, which left the Court because it changed its status to one of British Overseas Territory, rejoined the Court in 1983 (*The Anguillan*, 2007).

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is an institution of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which consists of six independent countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and three British Overseas Territories (Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat) (OECS, 2010a, 2011). The Court is located in Castries, Saint Lucia, which is also where the OECS is located (Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 2011a; OECS, 2010b).

The Court is important as a truly international court, since it also serves as the judicial systems of member countries and territories, since all the member countries and territories share the Court as their national judicial system. Therefore, the Court serves as the national court system of member countries and territories, and also as the regional international court of the OECS. The Court has two divisions, namely the Court of Appeal, and the High Court (OECS, 2011). The High Court judges are based in each member country and territory, while “the judges of the Court of Appeal are residents in Saint Lucia and travel to each [country or] territory to hear appeals from the High Court [and the] final appeals go to the Privy Council in the UK” (OECS, 2011). It is also important to note that, though in 2011 OECS countries and territories used the Privy Council in the United Kingdom as their final court of appeal, three countries (Barbados, Belize, and Guyana) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (to which OECS countries and territories also belong) used the Caribbean Court of Justice as their final court of appeal (Channel5Belize, 2010; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2011; Privy Council, 2011a, 2011b).

Also, since the judges of the Appeal Court division of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court travel to each country and territory to hear appeals, the Court is an itinerant court (Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 2011c; OECS, 2011). The Court has very distinguished judges (*The Anguillian*, 2007; Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 2011a, 2011b), and in terms of its administrative aspects, very qualified Court Registrars and other

court administrators focus on the administration of the various components of the Court (*The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010). The Court also provides training for judges through its Judicial Education Institution; and it boasts an excellent law library unit (Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 2011e, 2011g). Therefore, on the whole, the Court has a strong organizational structure.

The primary function of the Court is “to interpret and apply the laws of the various member states of the OECS” (*The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010), since all the member countries and territories use the Court as their joint national court system. “The Court has unlimited jurisdiction in each member state” (*The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010). This reality is also due to the fact that the Court serves as a joint national court system for all member countries and territories. The Court also “performs the vital function of administering over judicial matters for the OECS” (*The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010). These strong functions of the Court logically result in the Court handling and deciding very vital judgments in each member country and territory (Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 2011f). According to the Annual Report of the Court, in 2010 “the number of appeals filed in the Court of Appeal [division of the Court] went from 366 to 387 between 2008 and 2009” (*The St. Kitts-Nevis Observer*, 2010).

THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

The Caribbean Court of Justice is a regional international court which is the judicial body or arm of CARICOM, the member countries of which are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The associated members of the CARICOM are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010a; CARICOM Secretariat, 2011). The Court was created in 2001 and is located in Port of Spain, capital city of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010e). The creation of the Court is seen as an important judicial development in the Caribbean region (Antoine, 2008; Franklyn, 2004; Pollard, 2004). One major motivating factor for its creation was the desire to use the Court to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom as the final court of appeal for those CARICOM member countries who were using the Privy Council

as their final court of appeal (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010a, 2010c). However, in 2011, as already noted in this study, only three members of the CARICOM (Barbados, Belize, and Guyana) had formally and officially adopted the Court as their final court of appeal, and had therefore left the Privy Council (Channel5Belize, 2010; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2011; Privy Council, 2011a, 2011b). As also noted in the beginning of this section of the study, the list of countries and territories that belong to CARICOM and, therefore, to the Caribbean Court of Justice also include countries and territories of the OECS. Additionally, as noted in the above section of this study on the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and as indicated by the list of the three CARICOM member states that had formally and officially adopted the Caribbean Court of Justice as their final court of appeal by 2011, none of the countries and territories of the OECS in 2011 had adopted the Caribbean Court of Justice as their final court of appeal. A “distinguished Jamaican judge Patrick Robinson” is among some of the people who hold the view that the social and psychological impacts of the past colonial era in the Caribbean play a role in the decision taken by Jamaica and other Caribbean countries and territories, like those of the OECS, as of 2011, not to formally and officially replace the Privy Council of the United Kingdom with the Caribbean Court of Justice as their final court of appeal (*The Daily Herald*, 2010).

In terms of the powers, functions, and jurisdiction of the Court, it is noteworthy that the Caribbean Court of Justice has both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010a, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2011s). The Court has original jurisdiction in the sense that it “will be discharging the functions of an international law in respect of the interpretation and application of the Treaty [of CARICOM]” (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010c). In terms of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court “considers and determines appeals in both civil and criminal matters from common law courts within the jurisdictions of member states of the community and which are parties to the Agreement Establishing” the Court; and therefore, “in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction”, the Court “is the highest municipal court in the region” (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010c). It is also important to note that in 2006 the Court began to have the power to arbitrate trade issues for CARICOM (*The Gleaner*, 2006).

Through the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, which handles the dynamics of appointment of judges to the

Court, the appointment of judges to the Court is adequately protected from undue political influence from CARICOM member countries or other political agents (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010b, 2010c). Also, through the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund, the salaries of the judges are adequately protected from the direct powers of governments of CARICOM member countries and territories which may wish to use the manipulation of the salaries of the judges of the Court to exert undue influence on the judgments and decisions of the judges of the Court (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010d, 2011e, 2011f, 2011g, 2011h). Therefore, through the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission and the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund mechanism, CARICOM has ensured that the Caribbean Court of Justice has adequate judicial independence from member countries and territories and the political and policy organs of CARICOM.

Additionally, within its very strong administrative structure, the Caribbean Court of Justice has the following departments: Financial Management; Court Information Systems Management; Court Protocol and Information Services; Court Library Services; Judicial Research Services; Judicial Support Services; Court Security Management; Court Facilities, Assets, and Office Management; and the Court Registry Department (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010f, 2011i, 2011k, 2011l, 2011m, 2011n, 2011o, 2011q, 2022r, 2011t, 2011u).

The judges of the Court have outstanding legal education and strong judicial experience backgrounds (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010g, 2010h, 2010i, 2010j, 2010k, 2010L, 2010m, 2010n, 2010o). Many of them regularly present papers in academic forums and also author articles in academic journals (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2011p; de la Bastide, 2007; Hayton, 2006; Saunders, 2010a; Saunders, 2010b). Additionally, at least one judge of the Court “is required to be an expert in international law [and] one judge is also required to be from the civil law tradition, reflecting the presence of civil law jurisdictions such as Suriname and Haiti” (Dayle, 2010). Expectedly, the strong profile of the judges results in sound judgments and decisions of the Court (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010o).

On the whole, the Caribbean Court of Justice has established a strong foundation as a regional international court. With more members of the CARICOM adopting the Court as the final court of appeal, the role of the court will grow and its contributions will increase.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the Central American Court of Justice, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Caribbean Court of Justice as shown by this study are regional international courts that reflect the realities of their respective member countries and their regions. They have shown remarkable ability to adapt and respond to the legal realities of their creation, histories, and goals.

The Court of Justice of the Andean Community is a regional international court that has a very prominent focus on intellectual property legal issues; and is also very active, as shown by the study. The Court's focus on intellectual property issues helps to promote the economic integration efforts of the Andean Community (to which the Court belongs as the judicial body of this regional integration organization).

The Central American Court of Justice reflects the long historical efforts by countries in Central America to have regional integration. The Court is also a regional international court that tries valiantly to perform its role in an environment where the consensus of member countries on regional integration has not always been unambiguous. Despite its issues it has been able to emerge as a respectable regional international court which handles and makes significant legal decisions.

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court has a unique role as a regional international court which primarily serves as shared or joint national court system for its members (which are mostly relatively small countries and territories in the Eastern Caribbean, which correctly decided that having their separate respective national court systems may not be adequately efficient or viable, due to their relatively smaller size as countries and territories). Therefore, the Court is a truly strong regional international court. The Court, as the judicial arm of the OECS, also serves as the judicial body of this regional integration organization.

The Caribbean Court of Justice stands out because it has both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. It has original jurisdiction as the international tribunal of CARICOM. The Court's appellate jurisdiction is in the form that also allows it to hear appeals from the national courts of its member countries, as the final court of appeal. The Court also has a strong organizational structure, very distinguished judges, and independence from governments of member countries.

On the whole as shown in this study, these four regional international courts have strong foundations that reflect the varying realities of their respective member countries, their respective regional integration organizations, and their respective regions. Also, expectedly, future developments in their respective regions will affect the respective futures of these four courts.

CONCLUSIONS

This study, on the whole, has shown how the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, and the Central American Court of Justice, have helped to shift some powers from national governments to regional bodies in the Caribbean, in the Eastern Caribbean, in the Andean Region, and in Central America, respectively. Therefore, these regional courts have helped to shape the profile of regional organizations in these respective regions. This study helps to gauge the level and degree of power shifts from national governments to the supranational/regional organization in each of their respective regions.

The four regional international courts identified in this study are located in South and Central America and in the Caribbean. On the whole they compare very well with the regional international courts in other regions of the world. For example, it has been noted that the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community have the same original jurisdiction functions as an international tribunal such as the European Court of Justice, the European Court of First Instance, and the International Court of Justice (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2010c).

One important factor that continuously affects these four regional international courts is the very significant frequent changes, in terms of the creation and the merging (or efforts to merge) of regional integration organizations in South and Central America and the Caribbean region. For example, in 2004 the Andean Community (which the Court of Justice of the Andean Community serves as its judicial body) merged with MECOSUR (member countries of which are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) and Chile, Guyana, and Suriname (note that the last two countries, Guyana and Suriname, are also member countries of the CARICOM, which has the Caribbean Court of Justice as its judicial body) to create the Union of South American Nations or Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) (UNASUR, 2011a, 2011b).

Also, in 2010 a new regional integration called the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was created, with member countries including all the countries in South, Central, and North America, and the Caribbean region, except Canada and the United States (Knight, 2010; MercoPress, South Atlantic News Agency, 2010, 2011; Mojonnier, 2010; Weisbrot, 2010). The way in which these new regional integration organizations function and grow will either marginally or drastically affect the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the Central American Court of Justice, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Caribbean Court of Justice.

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THE " MEXICAN Moment "

Where to Turn - Latin America, Asia or North America?

ADOLFO LABORDE

Abstract • The foreign policy approach of President Enrique Peña Nieto's government has led to the media endorsement of the idea of the "Mexican Moment". In view of this phenomenon this article examines Mexico's foreign policy under President Nieto's administration, focusing specifically on Mexico's existing international relationship with Latin America, Asia and NAFTA.

Keywords Mexico • politics • the "Mexican Moment"

INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this article is to assess Mexico's foreign policy one year after President Enrique Peña Nieto took office. The article also aims to describe the positive impact of Mexico's foreign policy achievements based on the international community's favourable perception (as captured in the media) of the so-called Mexican Moment.¹ This paper argues that the alignment of achievements in international and domestic policy (political and economic reforms) and in foreign policy activism,² bolstered by a robust international media campaign, have contributed to shaping the world's current perception of Mexico.

However, the "Mexican Moment" is not an end in itself, but a means towards consolidating relations with our traditional partners, such as those in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and launching real diversification of our economic and political relations with strategic regions such as Europe,* Asia and

* Europe has been excluded from this study because it has been going through a process of economic recovery following the financial crisis in 2008, which had negative effects on the economies of Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Greece. This did not augur well for the diversification of our economic relations. However, this market should not be abandoned since it will soon recover and some of its members are strategic partners, both economically and politically, for Mexico.

Latin America. This would ensure the national interests set forth in the current administration's National Development Plan (NPD) are served.

In this context, when compared to the previous administration, there have been significant changes. It would be somewhat tedious to list all of the many trips President Enrique Peña has made before and after taking office. Instead, I would like to focus on major issues, those that I consider to be the backbone of this administration's foreign policy. According to our constitution,³ the President of the Republic is responsible for foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out that policy through the Minister of Foreign Affairs (SRE). This needs to be clarified as it is sometimes believed that the Minister is responsible for foreign policy and not the President.

It is the Foreign Affairs Minister who "in consultation with" the President charts the critical course to reflect what the President in his judgment deems to be in the national interest. This is documented in the NPD, mainly in the section entitled "Mexico con Responsabilidad Global";⁴ and is also evident in our diplomatic initiatives.⁵ In this context, I would like to identify what in my view have been the three main changes in Mexican diplomacy over the period December 1, 2012 to present.

First, there has been a return to what was known prior to 2000 as Mexico's diplomatic tradition, governed by seven basic principles⁶ or instruments which have guided this tradition for more than 70 years – namely, self-determination of peoples; non interference in the internal affairs of other states; peaceful resolution of international disputes; prohibition of either the threat or the use of force in international relations; Equality of States; international cooperation for development; and the fight for peace and international security. The latter can be corroborated with current activism and the closing of the Ministry in countries where, if these principles are ignored, Mexico does not attempt to restore diplomatic relations. To continue such relations would be to waste time and human resources, which should be dedicated to other priorities, such as the cases of Cuba and Venezuela.

Second, the outward strategy has been realigned once more with the principles that guide other government departments and agencies, notably, for example, ProMéxico and the Ministry of Finance and the Economy, among others.

Third, an effort has been made to return to what was called "diplomatic employment". Although in some cases ambassadors

have been political appointees, in most cases these officials have the necessary tools to perform efficiently and to carry out the duties entrusted to them by President Peña. Of course, there are exceptional cases. Without trying to justify this, it can be noted that it is common practice in most of the world's foreign ministries.

This essay continues with a discussion of relationships of "Mexican Moment" with the countries of Latin America, Asia, and North America.

LATIN AMERICA

The October 2013 Iberoamerican Summit held in Panama City, Panama,⁷ holds the key to Latin America's position with respect to Mexico. We are aware of the countless encounters and conflicts Latin America has experienced throughout its history as an independent entity. First there were efforts at political integration after independence and the idea of forging a single nation that would be "Our America", in the words of Bolívar and Martí – far removed from European and US influence. Later there were efforts at economic unification through regional integration initiatives, such as the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), subregional treaties such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Pacific Alliance, and bilateral arrangements such as the free trade agreements between Mexico and a number of countries in the region. For one reason or another, this integrationist dream has not been realized. Far from it, Latin America is divided over ideological differences that, in the words of former Bolivian President Carlos Meza, "are less when managed".⁸

The various historical events leading to unrest and turmoil have created a mosaic, with the result that now six countries in the region are considered leftist, and fourteen of the center-left or center-right. That aside, the question we should be asking is: When will we leave the political and economic differences behind and make the move toward real integration? The answer seems to be that real integration will not happen for a long time if steps are not taken toward true regional cooperation and integration. I believe that the obstacles have to do with regional differences. A clear example is Mexico, a diversified country ready for globalization with the intensification in its competitive power. At the other end of the spectrum is Chile, which has ceased to be competitive because of rising wages.

Central America and the Caribbean are facing some economic and services orientation problems. Although Latin America has benefited from a boom due to rising prices of raw materials, there still has not been any significant transformation in production, except in the case of Chile and Peru. Furthermore, the United States has failed to take off because of internal political and economic problems, and Europe hit rock bottom and is experiencing slow recovery. China and India are also in a state of economic slowdown, which will have an impact on their trading partners in the region.

This, basically, is the situation in our region. Of course, without downplaying other subregional initiatives, there are two processes of integration and cooperation under way: in the political sphere, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance⁹ in the sphere of economics. In my opinion, the Pacific Alliance aims to counter MERCOSUR geopolitically and geoeconomically by increasing its participation in interregional trade, which has now reached 50.2%, and in possible negotiations en bloc with respect to regional or international policy issues. Regardless of any possible clashes with respect to leadership issues, I think the region should move toward system of open regionalism, as proposed by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), but with the additional dimension of politics. We would then talk about open economic and political regionalism where the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Iberoamerican Summit, and the Organization of American States (OAS) should also play a more active role in achieving what many Latin Americans yearn for – real and not just functional integration, “Our Latin America”, where pragmatism, tolerance, and innovation would play a major role.

ASIA

According to information from the Ministry of the Economy, in 2013 Mexico had a favourable trade balance of US\$2,270,535 (exports totalled US\$184,112,094, and imports reached US\$180,841,558). However, with Asia we still have a deficit, which should lead us to rethink our trade policy toward that region, and to be consistent with the idea presented by President Peña’s administration, i.e. diversifying our trade relations with the outside world and no longer relying the US market.¹⁰ Figures for the trade balances with our three main partners in the region show a clear disadvantage.

According to figures from the Bank of Mexico, in 2012 we had a

deficit of approximately US\$-21198.6 million in our trade balance with China, our main economic partner in Asia. The picture was not very different with Japan, even though we signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2004, which came into force on April 1, 2005, and which, I believe, has not been exploited to the fullest. In 2013 alone, we had a trade deficit with Japan of approximately US\$-6448.2 million, and the quotas that protect the Agreement were not been filled, with most businesses preferring to focus on traditional markets because of the complexities that seem to exist in the non traditional markets. This is where the opportunity lies with both China and Japan.

In this regard, it is not simply a question of a statement or the use of Free Trade Agreements. According to ProMéxico,¹¹ our country has “a network of 13 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 45 countries, 28 Agreements for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (APPRIs), and 9 trade agreements (Economic Complementation and Partial Scope Agreements) under the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).” Human resources capable of facing the challenges of Mexico’s international economic relations, in this case with the Asian countries, are needed. We know that China, Japan and Korea are Mexico’s main trading partners in Asia; however, we have a trade deficit with all of them which, far from helping our public finances, causes them to deteriorate.¹² This diagnosis seems to be a given; here is where the problem lies. We have not moved from diagnosis to implementation. What would we need to do in order to turn our trade balances on the Chinese, Japanese, or Korean markets into surpluses? Good question. Each case represents a different scenario. To begin with, we must consider that each of these countries has its own characteristics (business culture). We cannot employ a generic business strategy in our policy toward the region; on the contrary, we must create a specific strategy for each case. There is a difference in doing business in China, in Japan and in Korea.

In addition, the stakeholders interested in extending or expanding economic relations with Asian countries (the private sector and government) must establish long-term human resource policies or economic representative specialists in each country. Although it is said that English is the language of business, not all Chinese, Japanese, or Koreans speak this language. Nonetheless, on the human resource issue, when compared to Asian countries, we

are several years behind. An example of this handicap is the policy on human resource training at the level of both the government and the industry – an initiative launched by Asian countries more than two or three decades ago. The Japanese (and now the Chinese and the Koreans) send their staff for at least two years of training in countries where they will serve as commissioners. The training consists of total immersion in the culture of the target country and in this way they learn the language, the culture, and social behaviours of the society. Therefore, when it came to doing business, they would have gained ground not only through their knowledge of the language, but in their understanding of feedback from their counterparts. Mexico faces many challenges, including improving our exports (capital goods).

If we want to be successful with our products with partners in the Far East, we must begin to create and implement a foreign economic policy where human capital undoubtedly plays a major role. If we do not act accordingly, we will continue to reap only a portion of the benefits from the opportunities these countries have to offer the Mexican export sector. Even though China is our largest trading partner in Asia, we do not share a Free Trade Agreement with that country; we seem to be unclear about whether or not to sign such an agreement; and in the case of Japan, we have not taken advantage of the EPA. If we do not give legal instruments to Mexican businessmen and do not encourage them to venture beyond North America, in 2015 our foreign trade will look very much like it did in 2005!

NAFTA

A year ago in February 2014, the annual meeting of the three members of NAFTA¹⁵ was held in the State of Mexico. It heralded the course of relations between Mexico, the United States, and Canada in the coming years. President Peña's new administration in Mexico has undertaken structural reforms, and President Obama's second term has prioritized immigration reform – providing fertile ground to pave the way for a second generation relationship. Nonetheless, I think there are still (perhaps traditional) issues on which the meeting could have concentrated, and which were bypassed, allowing the two countries to forego this great opportunity to deepen ties and take steps toward the positive development of relations. These issues include security, drug trafficking, organized crime, trade and, of course, immigration.

Although it has been stressed that this time the economic agenda was the guiding thread, it would be naïve of us to think that the current immigration debate in the United States and its attendant issues, such as security, were not discussed. Thus, the Mexican government should be prepared to be respond to any of the scenarios presented based on the information circulated in the media. The question is how, or in what way?

I think it would be very helpful to have a constructive stance on the possible discussion of immigration reform in the coming months. We know it is an issue of domestic politics in the United States, and that our country has little influence; however, the Mexican government has not informed nationals living in that country of the type of support they will receive from our consular authorities (there are 50 consulates in the United States). If that were to happen, I think the media would track the approval of immigration reform on the basis of shared responsibility between the two countries. It is not an isolated or a unilateral issue. There are countless citizens who do not have official documents that show they are Mexicans (passport, birth certificate, or voter ID card, which are the most common). To achieve this, first the number of people who need this service would have to be ascertained. Also, it is not known how many Mexicans will need support to pay the fines that would be generated by the start-up of the regularization process.

There has been no comment on this matter, nor has there been any significant increase in the 2014 budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that would allow for the hiring of operational staff in consulates in the United States to meet the demand for consular services that any eventual immigration reform may give rise to. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, and in order to avoid contaminating the upcoming immigration agenda, both President Obama and President Peña talked about important but not urgent issues, such as economic cooperation, where it is expected emphasis will be placed either through the signing or consolidation of joint programmes.

The reactivation of NAFTA was also raised, and the possible transition to a free trade arrangement with integrationist overtones – incorporating businesses first with the European Union and later with other integration or free trade arrangements. Whatever the visit may have covered, it laid the foundation for better understanding and horizontal cooperation that will change the notion of Mexico (and Latin America) as the backyard of the

United States. Also, every time leaders of the two regions meet, it is only to formalize plans or previously agreed upon projects. This too must change.

CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded that there have been tangible advances in foreign policy, supported not only by President Peña’s travels abroad (international activism), but also by the change of direction and a return to what worked before. Smart strategies have also been adopted to operate a foreign policy at the level of international relations of a middle power, as Mexico is today, which reinforces the notion and image in the world of the “Mexican Moment”. This has been achieved through the impact of international media dissemination of the domestic economic, political and social policy objectives achieved and their alignment with the foreign policy objectives pursued. The “Mexican Moment” is therefore the product of this close relationship in which structural reforms undertaken in Mexico in 2013 and endorsed by political agreements of various parties played an important role.

At present, there are challenges to our Mexican diplomacy, such as repositioning Latin America and the Caribbean; reducing asymmetries in our relations with North America; changing the approach to partnership with the countries of the Pacific; and regaining lost spaces in Europe and resuming our presence in Africa. I think we are not very far from achieving these goals. However, the long-term vision as well as human and economic resources must undoubtedly be part of any foreign policy strategy, whether traditional or pragmatic. This will certainly help the “Mexican Moment” become the “Mexican Success”.

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Notes

1. For more information on Mexico’s road to change as described by authors such as Jorge G. Castañeda, see Shannon O’Neil’s article, “A Transformed Society, Economy, and Government,” *Foreign Affairs* (March–April 2013). <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/shannon-k-oneil>. Consulted February 10, 2014.

2. Part of this analysis is based on opinion and analysis presented in Jorge A. Schiavon & Rafael Velázquez Flores, *La política exterior de México, 2012-2018: diagnóstico y propuestas* (Mexico: AMEI, 2012).
3. Enshrined in the Constitution of the United Mexican States, Art. 89, section 10. For more information, see <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf.pdf>. Consulted February 10, 2014.
4. For more information on the National Development Plan, see <http://pnd.gob.mx>. Accessed February 9, 2014.
5. Regarding the first year of President Enrique Peña Nieto's government, see Adolfo Laborde, "Peña Nieto apostó por regresar por la diplomacia tradicional," *CNN México* (November 27, 2013). <http://mexico.cnn.com/opinion/2013/11/27/opinion-pena-nieto-aposto-por-regresar-a-la-diplomacia-tradicional>. Consulted February 10, 2014.
6. For more information about the basic principles of Mexico's foreign policy, see <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/sia/spi/DPI-ISS-08-05.pdf>. Consulted February 10, 2014.
7. Regarding the results of the Iberoamerican Summit see Adolfo Laborde, "México y el añejo deseo de que América Latina esté unida," *CNN México* (October 25, 2013). <http://mexico.cnn.com/opinion/2013/10/25/opinion-mexico-y-el-anejo-deseo-de-que-america-latina-este-unida>. Consulted February 8, 2014.
8. Speech in Mexico City, November 2013, at Club de Industriales.
9. On the geopolitics and geoeconomics of these regional blocks, see Adolfo Laborde, "La Alianza del Pacífico," *Negocios de ProMéxico* (Vol. VIII, August, 2013), 76-77.
10. On the opportunities that Asia's market offers Mexico, see Adolfo Laborde, "Asia: oportunidades de diversificación comercial," *Negocios de ProMéxico* (Vol. V, May, 2013, Mexico), 72-73.
11. For more information, see http://www.promexico.gob.mx/en_us/promexico/home. Consulted February 8, 2014.
12. For more information about statistics on foreign trade with Asia, see Mexican Ministry of the Economy. <http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-negocios/comercio-exterior>. Consulted February 8, 2014.
13. For the lead-up to the visit, see Adolfo Laborde, "La visita de Obama puede relanzar la relación entre México y Estados Unidos," *CNN México* (May 1, 2013). <http://mexico.cnn.com/opinion/2013/05/01/opinion-la-visita-de-obama-puede-relanzar-la-relacion-entre-mexico-y-eu>. Consulted February 10, 2014.

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